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11. Introduction
In October 2007, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) commissioned ECOTEC Research and 
Consulting Ltd, in partnership with Professor Trevor Buck, of Leicester De Montfort Law 
School, De Montfort University, to evaluate the use of Early Neutral Evaluation (ENE) (a type 
of Alternative Dispute Resolution) in the Social Security and Child Support (SSCS) Tribunal. 
This report represents the final findings of this evaluation.
Context
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is the collective term for the ways that parties can settle 
civil disputes, with the help of an independent third party and without the need for a formal court 
or tribunal hearing. Some work had been undertaken in civil courts to test ADR approaches. 
The Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA) White Paper of 2004 ‘Transforming Public 
Services: Complaints Redress and Tribunals’ set out an intention to assess whether a range of 
dispute resolution approaches could provide alternatives to hearings in the Tribunals Service 
context. That intention was carried forward to the Tribunals Service business plan and fits with 
MoJ1 Departmental Strategic Objective 2: ‘Delivering fair and simple routes to civil and family 
justice’ (MoJ, 2009) which seeks to achieve the three outcomes:
 ● increased efficiency and effectiveness of the civil, administrative and family justice systems;
 ● provision of early advice and support to enable disputes to be resolved out of court or 
tribunal wherever possible; and
 ● accessible justice system that provides support where it is needed. 
This ADR project was a direct result of this policy, which aimed to operate and evaluate pilot 
ADR services. The ADR technique trialled in this pilot was Early Neutral Evaluation which 
involved a preliminary assessment by a Tribunal Judge of the facts, evidence or legal merits 
of appeal cases. The focus of this pilot was appeals in the Social Security and Child Support 
Tribunal2 against decisions related to entitlement to, and level of, Disability Living Allowance 
(DLA) and Attendance Allowance (AA). The decision-making body for these benefits was 
the Pension, Disability and Carers Service (PDCS), part of the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP).3 DLA and AA represented around 33% of the total volume of 229,123 
appeals through the SSCS Tribunal from April 2007 to March 2008.4 
1 The MoJ was created from the DCA and parts of the Home Office in 2007.
2 This Tribunal and others were transferred into the new ‘First-tier Tribunal’ with effect from 8 November 
2008 under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. The Social Security and Child Support 
Commissioners, who take appeals from SSCS Tribunal decisions, now form the core of the new ‘Upper 
Tribunal’. The SSCS Tribunal has been placed within the ‘Social Entitlement Chamber’ of the First-tier 
Tribunal, while the Commissioners are now styled ‘Upper Tribunal Judges’ and will hear cases within the new 
‘Administrative Appeals’ Chamber of the Upper Tribunal.
3 The Pension Service and Disability Carers Service were previously separate executive agencies of the 
Department for Work and Pensions, brought together to form a single agency from April 2008.
4 Other appeals include Incapacity Benefit (33%), Jobseeker’s Allowance (8%), Income Support (8%), Industrial 
Injuries Disablement Benefit (3%), Child Support Assessments/Departures (1%) and others (11%) as detailed 
in Tribunals Service (2008) President’s Report, 2007-08.
2The pilot initially began operating in two areas: Sutton (outer London Borough) and Bristol 
in September 2007 and January 2008 respectively. It was originally intended that the pilot 
would operate for six months. However, in order to ensure a sufficient number of cases going 
through the pilot to allow for robust analysis, a decision was taken by MoJ and the Tribunals 
Service to extend the pilot to the end of January 2009.5 The geographies of these initial pilot 
areas were also widened from August 2008, specifically to include Cardiff and Bexleyheath, 
with the intention to increase the flow of cases through the pilot.
Pilot aims and objectives
The primary objective of the ADR pilot was to identify, test and propose successful and cost-
effective alternative mechanisms for resolving administrative appeals without the need for a 
full tribunal hearing. It aimed to:
 ● provide a less formal and more convenient means of resolving the matter for the parties;
 ● provide a more tailored solution for the dispute, a proportionate approach and faster 
resolution for users;
 ● increase efficiency for tribunals administrators by speeding up case resolution, reducing 
the number of hearings and adjournments, releasing resources to improve service to 
cases requiring a hearing; and
 ● determine what factors contribute to the success of alternative dispute resolution and, 
therefore, to understand where else (in the Tribunals Service) they may be applied.
Pilot operation
Participation in the ADR pilot was voluntary. A letter explaining the ADR process and inviting 
appellants to opt-in, plus an ADR opt-in form was sent to the appellants alongside the Tribunals 
Service pre-hearing enquiry form, the TAS1. Where appellants had opted in, it was intended 
that the pilot operated as follows, although the evaluation found some slight deviation from this. 
 ● Within four weeks of the appeal submission being received by the Tribunals Service, 
ENE was conducted where the papers were read by one of the nominated District 
Tribunal Judges (DTJ). This formed stage one of the ADR process. The DTJ assessed 
the likely outcome of the appeal based on the information in the submission. The 
approach taken by the pilot was to have two DTJs in each of the four pilot areas who 
had one dedicated day per week for ENE work.
 ● The DTJ then contacted the party who in his or her opinion was likely to lose the appeal. 
This formed stage two of the ADR process. If the losing party was the PDCS, the DTJ 
explained what decision they thought the tribunal would make and why and invited the 
PDCS6 to reconsider their decision. If the DTJ believed that the appeal was likely to fail, he 
5 Only pilot cases concluded by the end of January 2009 were included in the analysis of this report.
6 It was agreed at the start of the pilot that the DTJ would speak to Higher Executive Officers (HEOs) rather 
than the specific Executive Officer (EO) Decision Makers who made the decision on the case.
3or she contacted the appellant or their appointed representative7 to explain their view. The 
DTJ discussed with the appellant the merits of their case and suggested that the appellant 
send in further evidence or that they seek advice or focus on the specific issues the tribunal 
would need to consider. Following this, the appellant could choose to withdraw their appeal or 
proceed to a hearing. The DTJ could also issue directions about the case such as a request 
for a Medical Examination Report or to convert the hearing from paper to an oral hearing.
 ● Alternatively, having read the papers, the DTJ might have concluded that he or she 
was unable to form a view of the likely tribunal outcome for that case. This could be 
because the issues were complex or the evidence was finely balanced. Under these 
circumstances, there was no contact with either party and the case went forward for 
hearing in the normal way, although the DTJ could issue directions about the case if he 
or she thought that necessary to avoid an adjournment. Where cases proceeded to a 
hearing, the DTJ who conducted ADR did not chair the tribunal panel and the panel was 
not aware that cases were part of the ADR pilot. 
There were seven measurable outcomes8 from the pilot process as summarised in Table 1.1 
and in the flow chart below. These potential outcomes of the process reflected the advice and 
potential decisions of the parties following the phone call. 
Table 1.1:  Pilot outcomes
Outcome 
number Process Outcome
1
ADR not carried out: opt-in form not returned or insufficient 
resources to carry out ENE
Hearing as normal
2
ENE carried out but not suitable for subsequent ADR. 
Directions may have been issued by DTJ
Hearing as normal
3
ENE carried out, appellant likely to win. DTJ telephoned 
PDCS- PDCS invited to reconsider. Decision either not 
reconsidered or reconsidered but decision unaltered
Case proceeded to 
hearing
4
ENE carried out, appellant likely to win. DTJ telephoned 
PDCS, PDCS reconsidered, decision revised in appellants 
favour, appeal lapsed*
Revised decision-no 
hearing and may have 
started new appeal
5
ENE carried out, appellant likely to lose. DTJ telephoned 
appellant and suggested action. Appellant withdrew appeal**
Case ends
6
ENE carried out, appellant likely to lose. DTJ telephoned 
appellant and suggested action. Appellant provided extra 
evidence or sought advice
Case proceeded to 
hearing
7
ENE carried out, appellant likely to lose. DTJ telephoned 
appellant and suggested action. Appellant did nothing
Hearing as normal
*  An appeal lapsed when a decision was revised by PDCS in the appellant’s favour before the appeal was 
heard.
** If an appellant wished to stop their appeal at any point, they could ask for the appeal to be withdrawn.
7 Appellants are able to nominate a representative to act on their behalf during the appeal process.
8 The Tribunals Service’s original design for the pilot identified ten outcomes but the data collected did not 
include sufficient information to differentiate between some outcomes.
Pool of eligible cases
DLA/AA entitlement appeals for hearing in Sutton or Cardiff centres
All informed of pilot and asked it they would be willing to take part
No
Pre-enquiry form returned but not 
the ADR declaration form
Hearing as Normal 
– OUTCOME 1
ENE carried out-
Stage one of the ADR 
process
ENE NOT carried out – 
insufficient resources
No
Pre-enquiry form returned but not 
the ADR declaration form
.
Po l of eligibl ases
DLA/AA entitlement appeals for hearing in
Sutton or Cardiff centres
All informed of pilot and asked it they
would be willing to take part
No
Pre-enquiry form returned but
not the ADR declaration form
Yes
Pre-enquiry form returned
along with completed and
signed ADR declaration form
ENE carried out-
Stage one of the
ADR process
ENE NOT carried out –
insufficient resources
Appellant likely
to win
Not suitable for ADR or
insufficient evidence to
form a view
Appellant likely
to lose
DTJ may make
directions for further
evidence
DTJ telephones PDCS to
explain their view and
invite reconsideration
Stage two of the ADR
process
PDCS does not
reconsider
Case proceeds to
hearing –
OUTCOME 3
PDCS reconsiders
Decision
NOT revised
Decision
revised
Case proceeds to
hearing –
OUTCOME 3
Revised decision in
appellant’s favour
Revised decision
NOT in appellant’s
favour
Appeal
Lapses
Appellant content
with revised
decision – no
hearing/new appeal
– OUTCOME 4
Appellant unhappy
with revised
decision – New
appeal –
OUTCOME 4
Hearing as Normal
– OUTCOME 2
DTJ telephones appellant
and suggests action(s)
Stage two of the ADR
process
Applt. Withdraws
appeal
Case ends
OUTCOME 5
Applt.
Provides
extra
evidence/
seeks advice
Case proceeds
to hearing –
OUTCOME 6
Applt. Does
nothing
Case proceeds
to hearing –
OUTCOME 3
Hearing as Normal
– OUTCOME 1
Hearing as Normal
– OUTCOME 1
Hearing as Normal
– OUTCOME 7
4
Figure 1.1 Pilot process potential outcomes
5Evaluation aims and objectives
The evaluation was commissioned to provide evidence of the extent to which the pilot 
exercise met its specific objectives. The overall aim of this evaluation was to determine the 
extent to which the ADR arrangements of the pilot exercise, namely the ENE technique, 
resulted in any benefits or efficiencies for the tribunal and for the appellants. More 
specifically, the evaluation sought to answer the following key research questions. 
 ● Does ADR (as deployed in this context) result in swifter and more proportionate 
resolution of appeal cases? Proportionate resolution in this context is defined as 
resolving disputes earlier and more effectively through strongly evidenced cases and 
opportunities to settle appeals outside of a tribunal.
 ● Is ADR cost-effective?
 ● Were appellants satisfied with the process? 
 ● Were there any other impacts of ADR?
 ● What other benefits or drawbacks were there of ADR?
 ● What impact did ADR have on the Pension, Disability and Carers Service (PDCS)?
 ● What do others (non-parties) think of ADR?
 ● Why do some appellants not opt into the ADR process?
The sub-questions in relation to these key questions are detailed in Appendix A.
Evaluation methodology
The approach to evaluating the ADR pilot comprised a number of strands.
Quantitative analysis
Spreadsheets were designed and maintained by Tribunals Service administrative staff 
at each pilot site for the purpose of evaluating the pilots. These spreadsheets gathered 
information on key stages in the progress of a case through the appeal process. Separate 
spreadsheets were completed for opt-in and non-opt-in cases to allow a comparison element. 
It should be noted, however, that the original design of the pilot did not allow a genuine 
experimental evaluation. Specifically, the control group (non-opt-ins) was drawn from the 
same broad population (the pilot areas) rather than a separate area. Likewise, the voluntary 
nature of the opt-in process prevented random allocation of cases to the opt-in or non-opt-in 
group. As such, therefore, it was possible that certain characteristics of the opt-in and opt-
out cases might underlie their differing progress and outcomes from the pilot. Manipulation 
and analysis of these spreadsheets was undertaken as part of the quantitative strand of the 
evaluation to provide some indications of the potential differences between the two groups 
of cases. This report presents the findings of these comparisons in respect of cost and time 
taken for case resolution for opt-in versus opt-out cases. The underlying assumption of 
these comparisons was that apart from the decision to opt-in or not, these cases had similar 
characteristics and, therefore, were directly comparable. While there was no evidence to 
6suggest that this assumption was not valid, the study design did not allow for a thorough 
investigation of whether the groups were indeed comparable. Therefore, it is important 
to interpret these findings with caution. Any apparent differences in cost and time of case 
resolution for opt-in and opt-out cases might be due to differences in case characteristics 
(e.g. appellant’s certainty of appeal outcome etc.) between opt-in and opt-out cases rather 
than as a result of the alternative dispute resolution intervention.
Further details of the quantitative analysis approach are provided in Appendix B. The 
completed spreadsheets were provided to the evaluation team at regular intervals during the 
pilots’ operation. Ongoing analysis was undertaken to provide regular overviews of the pilots’ 
progress as well as in-depth analysis to coincide with the interim report in June 2008, an 
update on the performance of the pilot in October 2008 and to inform the final report.
Unit cost analysis
The approach to assessing the cost effectiveness of the pilot was the development of 
average unit costs for different elements or key staff in the pilot. These were based on fixed 
costs provided by the Tribunals Service or calculations based on time inputs. The time 
inputs were calculated from average times recorded on the pilot spreadsheets or separate 
timesheets. These were then used to produce average costs for opt-in and non-opt-in cases 
from the ADR pilot. This allowed analysis of any cost savings, or additional cost associated 
with the ADR process, compared to the traditional appeals process. The Tribunals, Courts 
and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCE), which came into force in November 2008, changed some 
aspects of the appeals process around how cases are managed. These changes reduced 
the differences between the ADR pilot process and traditional process and potentially 
reduced the additional costs associated with ADR. However, given the timing of the change, 
it was too late in the evaluation pilot to robustly examine the potential implications of these 
changes to include them in the cost analysis.
Qualitative interviews
A key strand of data collection for the evaluation was qualitative interviews with staff, 
participants and stakeholders involved in the ADR process. These interviews sought to 
gather their views and perceptions of the process and impact of the pilot from different 
perspectives. Interviews were undertaken with the following.
 ● Administrative and management staff from the Tribunals Service engaged in 
delivering the pilot in each area. A total of seven face-to-face interviews were undertaken 
in April 2008 and November 2008.
 ● Four DTJs, two from each inital pilot region, responsible for conducting ADR. Six 
interviews were conducted in total in April 2008 and November 2008. This included 
two additional short telephone interviews with two DTJs in one area in January 2009 
to explore any impact following the widening of the pilot boundaries as the earlier 
7interviews were conducted prior to this occurring in this pilot area. These later interviews 
also aimed to explore any potential effects on the ADR opt-in process of the operational 
reforms introduced under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 which came 
into force in November 2008.
 ● Four PDCS staff, conducted in May 2008 and December 2008. 
 ● Eighty appellants or representatives, including 60 interviews with those who had 
opted-in for the ADR process and 20 interviews with those who had not opted-in. The 
sample included 50 interviews in the Sutton and Bexleyheath pilot area and 30 in the 
Bristol and Cardiff area. The majority of these appellants (80%) were making claims 
against DLA. These interviews took place after conclusion of an appellant’s appeal to 
allow the interview to capture information on the appeal process and outcome.
 ● Representatives from eight professional welfare rights groups or support 
organisations who represented or worked with appellants through the appeal process, 
conducted in December 2008 and January 2009.
All the qualitative interviews were transcribed and subject to primary and secondary content 
analysis using an analytical framework to examine the data against the key research 
questions and themes.
Full details of the methodology for the evaluation are provided in Appendix B. 
Content of the report
The remainder of this report details the process and impact evaluation findings as follows.
Chapter 2: Process evaluation
 − The first section of this chapter reports qualitative findings in terms of pilot opt-in. 
 − The second section examines qualitative findings concerning the two stages of the 
ADR process, namely ENE and telephone calls to appellants. 
 − The third section examines quantitative findings concerning the pilot’s delivery.
 − The fourth section explores the administrative processes associated with the pilot.
Chapter 3: Pilot impact and outcome evaluation
 − The first section examines the quantitative outputs and outcomes emerging from 
the pilot.
 − The second section reports on the qualitative outcomes from the pilot.
 − The third section explores the cost effectiveness of the pilot.
Chapter 4: Conclusions and recommendations
 − Summarises key findings from the implementation of the pilot and examines key 
recommendations should the ADR process be continued.
82. Process evaluation
Pilot process: appellant opt-in 
This section presents the evaluation findings on the operation of the appellant opt-in 
aspect of the ADR process. It provides evidence in response to the following key research 
questions.
 ● Why do some appellants not opt into the ADR process?
 ● Were appellants satisfied with the process? 
 ● What do others (non-parties) think of ADR?
The findings reported in this chapter were principally drawn from qualitative interviews 
conducted with Tribunals Service staff, DTJs, appellants and representatives from welfare 
rights groups. 
Key findings
 ● Overall the respondents reported that the opt-in process worked reasonably well, and 
there was clear evidence of appellants making informed and active decisions to opt-
in, focusing on specific potential benefits of the process. For others, the decision to 
opt-in was for more practical reasons, to avoid travelling to, or appearing at, a hearing. 
Others actively chose not to follow the non-ADR route based on advice or personal 
experience of the tribunal system.
 ● Some appellants sought support and advice from relatives or support organisations to 
help them understand the ADR process and were able to make an informed decision 
about opt-in as a result.
 ● There were other appellants who generally had a more limited understanding of 
what they were opting into, or had automatically signed the papers without any 
understanding of the process they were entering. As such, they appeared to be 
making passive decisions to opt-in. This could be because they had little experience 
of similar systems, or had limited mental capacity through disability or ill-health. There 
were also examples of appellants with limited literacy levels, and many more who felt 
uncomfortable or confused by complex paperwork and forms. 
 ● Those who actively opted in generally understood they were not being disadvantaged 
by utilising ADR, and knew they could revert to the full tribunal if they were dissatisfied 
with the ADR process or if the ADR process did not resolve their appeal. 
 ● An underlying problem in determining and analysing appellants’ reasons for whether 
to opt-in or not to the pilot exercise was that appellants were generally unfamiliar with 
the ‘new product’ of ADR, compared to an iconic tribunal hearing model. To an extent, 
the pilot exercise had to ‘sell’ the value of the new product as compared with the more 
familiar old product. 
9Operation of the opt-in process
Participation in the ADR pilot was voluntary. A letter explaining the ADR process and 
inviting appellants to opt-in, plus an ADR opt-in form was sent to the appellants. Initially, 
this information was sent out by the PDCS within the appeal submission pack, alongside 
the Tribunals Service pre-hearing enquiry form, the TAS1. From November 2008, however, 
responsibility for sending out the pre-hearing enquiry form transferred to the Tribunals 
Service following reforms introduced under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. 
From this point onwards, the pre-enquiry form was sent separately from the submission pack. 
An administrative decision was taken to keep the ADR opt-in form and explanation letter 
together with the pre-enquiry form so these were also sent out by the Tribunals Service in the 
last three months of the project.
The ADR explanation letter was drafted in conjunction with communication experts from 
DWP in order to ensure the accessibility of the letter for appellants who may have potential 
literacy issues. The Tribunals Service sought to increase the visibility of the ADR explanation 
letter and opt-in form by printing them on yellow paper.
To support the opt-in process, the Tribunals Service contacted representative groups, 
advocacy and support agencies for people with disabilities and their carers in the 
geographical areas of the pilot. They were informed about the pilot and the process to enable 
them to explain ADR to appellants should they be approached for advice. 
Reasons for opt-in
Appellants, who had opted into the ADR process by signing and returning the ADR opt-
in form, demonstrated varying levels of understanding of the process underlying this 
decision. Some focused on specific positive benefits of the process, backed by a genuine 
understanding of the process. There were other appellants, however, who had clearly signed 
the opt-in form, as their case was going through the ADR process. However, they were not 
clear that they had done this or why. Evidence from the interviews suggested that others 
were prepared to try something new or ‘alternative’ to the existing system:
 ● to speed the process up; 
 ● to have someone to discuss the case with;
 ● to get an independent eye over the case; or 
 ● because they felt desperate. 
In addition, there were many appellants who stated that they wanted to use ADR to avoid 
travelling to, or appearing at, a hearing. This analysis therefore allowed the classification 
of the extent to which people ’actively’ or ’passively’ opted in to the ADR process. The 
researchers consider some of the appellant reasons for opting into the pilot in more detail, 
below.
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Actively opting-in
There were several cases where appellants had actively taken a decision to opt-in as a 
result of reading the ‘yellow’ ADR letter. When asked to explain why they had opted into 
ADR, a group of appellants gave clear and rational explanations of their decision to opt-
in, suggesting they made an active choice to opt-in. The letter describing ADR was, for 
them, generally clear and explained the purpose of the ADR process reasonably well. 
These appellants and representatives typically described their impression of the purpose 
and process of the ADR pilot very much in terms of the pilot’s objectives. For example, one 
representative stated that their first impression of the ADR process was that it was positive 
and fair, and, therefore, felt that it was definitely worthwhile opting in: 
“I wanted to opt for it right from day one, to be honest when I got the letter I was 
more than happy” 
(Sutton opt-in representative)
Similarly, another appellant explained their initial understanding of ADR from the letter, which 
reflected the pilot nature of the process: 
“I thought it was a new scheme that the government was bringing in that would 
help individual cases” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
Clearly the ADR process, being new, and for most appellants something different from 
anything they had experienced before, was not always immediately understood. Some 
appellants had to read the letter several times to understand it: 
“I had to read the letter on a few occasions, because as I say it takes me a long 
time for it to actually sink in. So I had to read it a good few times, but then I 
started to read it and I thought oh yes well they say that they might be able to sort 
it out for me and if that’s the case then I’ll try it. So I thought yes I’ll go for it”
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
Overall, these appellants typically said ADR was a means to give them the best chance they 
could get for their appeal or that it was an opportunity to explore every avenue. This was 
often founded on a general sense that whatever ADR was offering it could not harm or hinder 
their case and could be beneficial. 
For other appellants, the reasons given for actively opting into the ADR process were that 
the process would improve their chances of getting a speedy, more efficient service, with 
the potential to generally improve their experience of the appeal process. As one appellant 
commented: 
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“I actually thought it would work better and you would be processed a lot quicker” 
(Sutton opt-in representative)
Another appellant described their understanding of ADR as: 
“it wouldn’t affect the appeal as such; it might just assist it, smooth it and 
streamline it”
(Bristol opt-in appellant)
There were also appellants who thought the process was more likely to result in an outcome 
they wanted to achieve from the appeal: 
“I just kind of got the impression this was maybe a bit different and it would be 
better for me if I agreed to it” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
In a small number of examples, appellants were simply transposing their wishes for the 
outcome from the appeal onto the ADR process. For example, one appellant described 
their view that if someone independent were to look at the case then they would see what 
the appellant perceived in terms of their care and mobility needs, and agree to award 
DLA because they felt that the case was so strong. Appellants felt that the DTJ who would 
conduct the review was someone who would listen to their case. This appellant felt: 
“[I opted in] because I was desperate, I was desperate for someone to listen, yes 
desperate”
 (Sutton opt-in appellant)
This desire for someone to speak to and listen to their story was commonly reflected in 
appellant interviews. 
Similarly, in many other cases where appellants made an active choice to opt-in, the DTJ 
acting as an independent reviewer of the case was mentioned as their reason for opting 
in. These appellants clearly understood that the Tribunals Service and the DTJ were 
independent of the PDCS. This attracted appellants to opt-in to the ADR process as they 
perceived that PDCS had made an incorrect decision in respect of their claim: 
“I thought to myself it was a very good idea because it was somebody else 
independent and the fact that twice they’d thrown out my claim it’s better to be 
dealt with by somebody independently, so you have a lot more confidence in that”
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
There was an isolated group of appellants who felt very negative about the appeal process, 
and the extent to which the tribunal panel would give them a fair hearing. Opting into ADR 
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was, therefore, seen as a way of getting a fair and unbiased appeal through the independent 
DTJ review, whereas they did not believe this was the case with the tribunal panel: 
“I could just picture myself sitting there in this little chair with all this row of people 
sitting up at a big table, banquet sort of table thinking, oh well no we won’t bother 
with that one, you know what I mean, they sort of looked at your paper and made 
a decision already and that is it” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
In other cases where appellants made an active, informed choice to opt-in, the reasons 
for opting in were less about the positive benefits of ADR and rather reflected a level of 
desperation to resolve the appeal by any means, or a strong desire to avoid a hearing. One 
appellant summed this up as: 
“the advantage is you haven’t got to wait for the date of the hearing, you haven’t 
got to take someone’s time up going to the hearing and all that” 
(Sutton opt-in representative)
ADR was perceived as a means to circumvent a drawn-out experience: 
“The actual hearing, yes, I thought it would sort of stop it getting to that stage. I 
thought if there is another process to go through that would be handy” 
(Bristol opt-in appellant)
Appellants who wanted to avoid a hearing fell into a number of groupings. Some appellants 
had been through the appeal and tribunal process before and had found an oral hearing 
unpleasant. For example, one appellant described how she chose to opt into ADR because 
she did not want to attend a hearing, as she had been to a hearing previously. 
“it’s like being in court, you’re going in there like a nervous wreck wondering what 
the hell is going to happen to you because this is your livelihood” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
Appellants with no previous experience of the appeal process were commonly apprehensive 
and daunted by the prospect of an appeal hearing. It seemed that these feelings were 
exacerbated where people had mental health conditions, anxiety or fear of judicial processes 
and formality: 
“I thought it was like a court, and it sort of made me nervous because I’ve never 
been into one before” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
There was a final group of appellants where the level or nature of their disability meant they 
wanted to avoid a hearing for more practical reasons, as this appellant stated: 
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“If you’re on DLA, it means disability living allowance doesn’t it, which means 
you’re disabled doesn’t it, basically, now how are you going to get to Sutton?” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
Frustration about the location of hearing venues was widespread, and coupled with the 
subject matter of DLA or AA appeals being personal to appellants, added up to them wanting 
to try another method of resolving their case without having a hearing, as illustrated by this 
appellant: 
“I mean there must be thousands of me around the country that cannot get to 
these places that they just pinpoint and say this is us, and especially when it’s 
over such a delicate thing” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
This was echoed by a number of appellants who found it distressing to talk about their 
condition in front of a panel, and ADR offered an easier option. In these situations, opting into 
ADR was an expedient choice. This was further reinforced by some non-opt-in appellants 
who reported that, with hindsight, they would have opted into ADR to avoid the hearing which 
they found an unpleasant and stressful experience. 
There were also cases, primarily in the early stages of the pilot, where appellants had opted 
into ADR on the basis that they would be able to avoid a hearing. However, they were 
not processed through ADR because of insufficient resources or lack of time. In fact, the 
appellants then felt ill-prepared to be called for a hearing without any preparatory call from 
the DTJ. This might have led to cases being more likely to be adjourned as evidence may 
not be prepared as appellants awaited a call and representatives were not being lined up for 
support and attendance of an oral hearing. As this appellant illustrated: 
“I thought I wouldn’t have to go there, so I didn’t go to speak to them [representative 
organisation]” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
Passively opting-in
Amongst other appellants, there was evidence of more limited understanding of the ADR 
process. Therefore, there was clear evidence that a proportion of the appellants who opted-
in to the ADR process had done so simply by signing the ADR opt-in form along with the 
pre-hearing enquiry form. They appeared not to really know what they had opted for. Some 
appellants who struggled to understand the letter had the support of a relative, carer or 
representative who could help them, and some had rung into the Tribunals Service for more 
information. Others did not seek assistance despite not understanding the letter. Reasons 
given for not seeking assistance included the cost of the call, dislike of telephones, not 
knowing what to ask and not knowing whom to call. These appellants were generally unclear 
about what ADR was. For example, there was an appellant who had interpreted that ADR 
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was a way for the Tribunals Service to assess whether the claim was genuine and detect 
fraudulent cases so that the latter would not go forward to a hearing and waste time and 
resources. There was also a case where an appellant with English for Speakers of Other 
Languages (ESOL) needs had concluded that the ADR offered a second chance of being 
successful in the appeal after a hearing had taken place. 
Despite the misinterpretations of what ADR was for amongst some appellants, or what ADR 
might provide, there were no clear cases of appellants who thought that the ADR process 
would remove their right to an appeal hearing. In this sense, the ADR pilot and appellants’ 
understanding did not undermine their belief that they could access an independent judicial 
system. In fact, a number of appellants clearly understood ADR as another means to resolve 
their appeal but if the suggestion was they might be the losing party they would simply revert 
to the original system and attend the appeal hearing: 
“I said I’ll do it, I knew it wasn’t prohibiting me from going to a tribunal, so I knew 
that” 
(Cardiff opt-in appellant)
For other appellants, even if they did not recall the specific steps of the process, with some 
due consideration, they understood that ADR was an additional avenue they could take to 
resolve their case: 
“I didn’t really know at first, it wasn’t until I’d read through it, really it was just 
another way around it, so I filled that out and sent that in as well, it was just a 
case of try everything because the doctor had advised me” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
The differing levels of understanding and varied interpretations of the ADR process 
suggested that there was a level of passive opt-in by appellants rather than a clear-cut 
informed choice. 
Where appellants reported being unaware that they had opted in, they often concluded that 
they must have just signed the ADR opt-in form along with the other forms received in the 
submission pack that required a signature: 
“I mean you get all these papers and you think well this is important this is the 
first one, this is the map how to get there and then the one to sign to say yes to 
say whether you’re coming or maybe a piece at the bottom of that” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
This supported the reasoning behind the change in process that resulted from the Tribunals, 
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 reforms. This led to the pre-enquiry form being sent by the 
Tribunal Service separately from the appeal submission materials from the PDCS to increase 
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its visibility. It was assumed that the ADR letter and opt-in form being sent separately would 
also increase the likelihood that appellants would take note of the process. 
Another reason for appellants’ passive opt-in to the ADR process was that the decision to 
opt-in was taken by a support worker, carer or welfare rights group representative, so the 
appellant had no direct knowledge of opting-in. For example, in one case, an appellant did 
not recall having opted into the ADR pilot but when his wife joined the interview it emerged 
that she took care of the paperwork. She had opted into the pilot, although she did not recall 
much about the process and her reasons for doing so. There was evidence from welfare 
rights group representatives to support this, with decisions to opt-in taken on behalf of 
appellants in an isolated number of cases (see section ’Welfare rights groups views on opt-
in’). While support workers, carers and representatives were working to support appellants 
and were assumed to act in the best interest of the individuals they were supporting, this 
potentially undermined the extent to which appellants were able to exercise their choice to 
opt-in to the ADR process.
In more isolated cases, appellants felt that generally there was not enough information 
provided about the appeals process to allow an informed decision about whether to proceed 
with the appeal process or opt-in to the ADR process.9 The role of support organisations 
was key here but, there was an issue for some appellants in knowing where to go for this 
information and accessing this information at the appropriate time during the appeal process. 
Some appellants required additional support to understand the ADR letter. Informed consent 
in the matter of choosing between an ADR process or the regular tribunal appeal process 
would ideally be best served by specialist representative organisations providing independent 
advice to serve their customers’ best interests. However, the regional variations of the 
levels of service provided by such organisations and the fact that appellants often approach 
relatives, who were not legal experts to act as representatives, will often result in appellants 
relying on the Tribunals Service and/or PDCS for advice and information.
Reasons for non-opt-in
As in the case of the appellants who opted into the ADR process, there was evidence that 
appellants also made both passive and active decisions to opt-out of the ADR process.
Passive decisions to not opt-in
During the early stages of the pilot, statistics recorded by the ADR project team showed that 
the ADR letter and opt-in form were not being sent by PDCS with all submission packs. This 
inconsistent distribution of the opt-in letter appeared to be a significant factor in the levels 
of appellants not opting into the ADR pilot as many appellants who did not opt-in had no 
9 Following the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act introduced in November 2007, the Tribunals Service 
have revised the Welcome pack sent to appellants in order to improve the information provided about the 
process.
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recollection of the ADR letter. Even when prompted by researchers about the ‘yellow letter’ 
they were adamant that they had not received it, as this appellant was: 
“I never got anything like that [a yellow letter], I didn’t have any options like that 
whatsoever”
(Sutton non-opt-in appellant)
For other appellants, the limited recall of the ADR letter and the subsequent opportunity 
to opt into the ADR process was due to the amount of paperwork received as part of the 
appeal process. This seemed to have meant that the ADR letter was often missed, even if 
it was printed on yellow paper. This was illustrated by researchers’ requests to look, with 
the appellants’ permission, at the file of communication about the case. In a small number 
of cases the ADR letter was found. This receipt of a large amount of paperwork was 
often compounded by other concerns at the time of starting an appeal. This led to limited 
consideration of the opportunities presented by the ADR pilot if the letter was in fact noted: 
“I don’t recall that… It doesn’t come to mind at all …with everything else going 
on in life as well, you know, think oh god this is one thing which we can really do 
without” 
(Sutton non-opt-in appellant)
There were cases of appellants who found the wording on the ADR letter difficult to 
understand. As such, they had not initially taken in the content of the letter, as one appellant 
explained: 
“it’s the wording they put, sometimes you don’t always understand what the 
words are that they’re saying on there, because I didn’t have anywhere to go for 
help or I didn’t know there was anywhere I could go for help... If I’d have had the 
back up from other people there might have been able to say well we’ll take this” 
(Sutton non-opt-in appellant)
There was evidence in all pilot areas that the lack of understanding of the ADR process 
extended to welfare rights group agencies. One opt-in appellant explained that she took the 
ADR letter to an advice agency, who advised her to refuse it as they did not understand the 
process as it was new. 
“Yes they said not to go with it because they said they didn’t fully understand 
what it was, so I didn’t. They were confused because that piece of paper said… 
what they were offering was not on… it would not be a final decision on what the 
DLA appeal would be, but they weren’t too sure about it”
(Sutton non-opt-in appellant)
Similar cases were found in Bristol. 
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Active decisions not to opt-in
Non-opt-in cases did, however, clearly illustrate that there were also cases where ADR was 
seen as a less attractive option compared to an oral hearing. This suggested some degree 
of active and informed choices being made by appellants not to opt-in to the process. This 
group of appellants had no desire for the case to be resolved without a hearing which they 
would attend. There were a number of appellants who explained that though ADR may be a 
good idea, they would not use it as they wanted to attend the hearing in person: 
“Probably I wouldn’t because I was determined to go through with the original 
process, because I wanted to know, I wanted to understand, so doing that I would 
think I’m bypassing the situation. I wanted to go and put my point forward, so 
probably I wouldn’t have opted in” 
(Bristol non-opt-in appellant)
Other non-opt-in appellants seemed to have a representative or support of some kind, 
perhaps making the hearing less daunting. They were often advised by professional 
representatives that they should attend the hearing as this would enhance their chances of 
success. For example, a benefits adviser told one appellant that they stood a better chance 
of success if they attended the hearing. 
“After speaking to [representative’s name] he said no, don’t consider that [ADR]. 
I didn’t particularly want to go because I knew I was going to be cacking myself, 
but he said its best you go because you stand a far better chance of getting your 
side across” 
(Sutton non-opt-in appellant)
Another appellant explained that she was quite willing to try ADR, and thought that it could 
have been beneficial but she was advised not to by the support organisation she consulted: 
“I was quite willing to do that but because the [welfare rights group] just didn’t 
know anything about it they advised me not to do it and just go straight to the 
appeal” 
(Sutton non-opt-in appellant)
The role of representative organisations was key here. There were a clear number of cases 
where they had been central in advising appellants not to use ADR as they believed it 
reduced the chances of a positive outcome. This is explored further below when the views of 
welfare rights groups are explicitly examined. 
Welfare rights group views on opt-in
Overall the representatives interviewed from welfare rights groups demonstrated good 
understanding of the ADR process. There were only isolated examples of misunderstanding 
of elements of the process, for example, that both parties would be contacted after ENE or 
that the losing party would be sent a letter rather than receive a telephone call. Typically, 
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welfare rights group representatives were satisfied with the level of information they 
had received about ADR. This was either an introductory letter or attending the external 
briefings delivered by the Tribunals Service. Both of these were viewed positively as they 
provided an opportunity to ask additional questions to clarify aspects of the process. As this 
representative recognised: 
“It was very helpful to actually go along and be able to ask questions. While the 
written briefing was good, there are just different shades of colour that you get 
when you go along and able to ask questions” 
(Welfare rights group representative)
There was evidence of internal dissemination within some welfare rights organisations, such 
as presentations or sharing of the introductory letter to ensure staff had the knowledge and 
awareness to support the opt-in process. The evidence suggested, however, that this did not 
take place in every welfare rights group as appellants reported contact with representatives 
who were not aware of, or did not understand the ADR process.
Among the welfare rights group representatives, there was mixed evidence as to the extent 
to which they were able to directly influence the process of opt-in, as sometimes the decision 
had already been taken by the time appellants sought advice from them. Often appellants 
had support workers, such as social workers or carers, who made the decision to opt-in or 
opt-out with appellants. Subsequently advice was sought from welfare rights groups with 
appellants or their support workers seeking either advice on providing additional evidence or 
professional representation at the hearing. 
In other cases, however, welfare rights group representatives had a more active role in the 
opt-in process. Overall, there was recognition that the advice given to appellants about 
whether to opt-in or not was largely dependent on the outcome that the appellant wanted 
to achieve from the appeal process and the representatives’ perception of the capability of 
the appellant to understand the ADR process. There was also recognition by some welfare 
rights groups that ultimately it was an appellants’ decision whether to opt-in. However, there 
were examples, outlined below, where appellants were not being given the opportunity to 
properly exercise this choice to opt-in, effectively undermining this principle of appellant 
choice. In some cases, welfare rights group representatives acknowledged that they would 
make the decision to opt-in as a matter of course, often without discussing this explicitly 
with appellants. There was a perception from welfare rights group representatives that some 
appellants would not understand the process, given their health conditions, and to them it 
was just another form. As this representative suggested: 
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“I have signed the form for a couple of other clients, one of them suffered from 
mental health problems and learning difficulties, a type of autism, so the process 
would mean very little to him”
(Welfare rights group representative)
Related to this, representatives highlighted that the ADR letter and opt-in form were quite 
wordy and that appellants would struggle with understanding them without a support 
worker or representative. This reinforced the need for accessible information to be provided 
to appellants to ensure they make an informed choice but also that welfare rights group 
representatives uphold the ethos of the voluntary opt-in process.
There were some examples where representatives advised appellants to opt-in, following a 
brief discussion with the appellant, as this representative summarised:
“Some of our clients are very vulnerable especially those with mental health 
problems and they get very, very stressed about having to sit in front of the 
tribunal, having to go through their problems, how their problems affect their 
living and all that, so now there’s a scheme that will look at it, look at the decision 
before having to go to the tribunal which is a big relief for them so I would 
recommend it to them” 
(Welfare rights group representative)
Alternatively, there was also evidence that welfare rights group representatives would, 
in some circumstances, actively advise against appellants opting into the ADR pilot. 
Representatives acknowledged that they would potentially advise appellants against opting 
in. For example, if they thought appellants would have to go to a hearing anyway as their 
case was more ‘borderline’, or where going to a hearing and presenting oral evidence was 
considered a better chance to get the level of DLA wanted. Representatives recognised 
that opting into ADR may be negative for appellants who were trying to avoid the hearing 
and had misunderstood the ADR process. In isolated examples, appellants thought that by 
opting into ADR it meant they would not attend a hearing at all, but if their case then went 
to a hearing they had greater anxiety about attending. Representatives recognised that if 
they had not opted in to ADR at all, the appellant could have prepared themself from the 
beginning to attend a hearing. This provided some indication that the way in which the ADR 
process was explained to users in the pilot exercise may have raised expectations too high, 
at least with some individuals. The implication of this is that the initial information introducing 
the new process needed to be very carefully described and calibrated in the pilot exercise. 
This should specifically flag up that it might actually lengthen the process and still result in a 
full tribunal hearing. Although if the delay was due to a request for further evidence then this 
could potentially improve the appellants’ chances of success.
This section presented the evaluation findings on the operation of the appellant opt-in aspect of 
the ADR process. The next section explores the stages involved in the process in more details. 
20
Pilot process: ADR activities 
This section covers the evaluation of the main processes involved in delivery of the pilot, 
focusing specifically on conducting the ENE review and telephone calls to the potential losing 
party. The research questions addressed in this section are as follows. 
 ● What impact did ADR have on the PDCS?
 ● What do others (non-parties) think of ADR?
 ● Were appellants satisfied with the process? 
Key findings
 ● The purpose of the ENE review was interpreted by DTJs as having a dual function, 
with potentially conflicting objectives: (1) to identify opportunities for early resolution 
without a hearing and (2) to quality check the evidence to achieve a fairer and more 
informed hearing. 
 ● Overall, telephone calls to PDCS and appellants were largely positively received. 
PDCS staff members were pleased with the opportunity to speak to a DTJ and 
recognised benefits in terms of improved decision consistency, and improving the 
quality assurance of decision-making. 
 ● For appellants, the confidential nature of the call, the sympathetic tone and manner 
adopted by the DTJs and the opportunity to simply have someone to talk the case 
through with were areas identified as contributing to their satisfaction. 
The ENE process 
The first stage of the ADR process was the ENE review, which involved the appeal papers 
being read by one of the nominated DTJs in each pilot area, to assess the likely outcome of 
the appeal based on the information in the submission. 
Interviews revealed that DTJs interpreted the purpose of the ENE element of the ADR pilot 
as having a dual function, foremost of which was to identify opportunities for early resolution 
without a hearing. The secondary purpose of ENE was outlined by DTJs as a quality check 
of the evidence, both of the PDCS processes and the preparedness of the appellant to 
best represent their case to achieve a fairer and more informed hearing. In pursuit of these 
functions, there was some evidence from interviews to suggest DTJs were using their 
discretion and expanding the purpose of the ENE beyond the narrow purpose of identifying a 
losing party to be contacted. This is explored in more detail below. 
The ENE was used to identify whether intervention, either in the form of issuing directions 
(internally or to appellants or through a telephone call) even in a case where a clear losing 
party was not identified, would advance the case. This was often in the knowledge that the 
case would still likely go to a hearing. As one DTJ described: 
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“I think I would say that probably there are a lot of examples where I have 
probably minimised or diminished the chance of an adjournment very 
considerably, but still said it should go to a tribunal” 
(District Tribunal Judge)
Findings from the quantitative analysis revealed that not all opt-in cases were subject to ENE. 
There were three per cent of opt-in cases that were subject to no parts of the ADR process 
because of a lack of time or resources. It became clear from interviews with DTJs that, in 
practice, there was an initial stage to the ENE review process which played a key role in 
identifying cases which were viewed as ‘suitable’ for the subsequent part of the ADR process. 
This was typically done through an initial skim read of the case papers by DTJs to gather 
an overview of the case to form a view of the opportunities for the ADR process to enhance 
the case. There was evidence from the Tribunals Service staff interviews that this filtering of 
cases had become a more important element of the ENE process as the DTJ workload had 
increased. During the summer months of 2008, the capacity of DTJs was particularly stretched 
due to staff absence and a peak in the number of opt-in cases. This led to identification of 
certain types of priority cases which were subject to the initial suitability check:
“Because of the substantial backlog that’s arisen we have found that we’re having 
to do a certain amount of filtering and what we’re doing at the present moment is 
that where we have cases where an appellant has opted for a paper hearing we 
will speed read those as a priority. If no opportunities for the ADR process leap 
out at us we will put it to one side” 
(District Tribunal Judge)
There was some evidence from Tribunals Service staff that during this particularly busy period, 
where a backlog of cases was building, a small proportion of non-priority opt-in cases i.e. cases 
which had opted for a paper hearing and were not due to go to an oral hearing, were not even 
assessed for initial suitability. Although these cases were typically referred back to DTJs for ENE 
in subsequent weeks, there was insufficient DTJ capacity to deal with the backlog. A decision 
was taken to allow the cases to progress to a hearing without being subject to ENE. As such, they 
were effectively treated as non-opt-in cases. There was a risk that this could act to undermine 
an appellants’ view of the appeal process, if they were expecting ADR to have impacted on 
their case. This outcome, however, was not communicated to appellants. As a result, it was not 
possible to explore the impact on appellants as they were unaware that this had occurred. 
Those cases identified as suitable for ENE following the initial review were typically those 
that displayed clear and outright weaknesses on the part of either the PDCS or appellant to 
determine the likely losing party. As one DTJ summarised: 
“I use the balance of probabilities, where one or other will win because of the 
evidence stated, or the combination of evidence, that is then suitable, otherwise 
they are not suitable for ADR” 
(District Tribunal Judge)
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In contrast, those cases deemed unsuitable, either after the initial review or following a more in-
depth ENE, were those where there was room for ambiguity or borderline in terms of which side 
was weaker. DTJs recognised that for those cases considered borderline, it was often more fitting 
to issue directions to recommend the gathering of specific evidence to enable clearer evaluation 
of the case at a hearing, which might potentially help avoid the need for adjournment. 
The following extracts from the judicial reports produced by DTJs at the end of each ADR 
day, provides examples of cases which were considered suitable or unsuitable.
Examples of suitable cases
 ● A ten-year-old appellant with autism and learning difficulties. This was an application 
by the appellant to supersede a previous award of Higher Rate Care and Lower 
Rate Mobility which had been refused. There was no evidence of severe behavioural 
problems in the papers. I, therefore, telephoned the appellant’s representative to 
indicate that the appeal was unlikely to succeed. The representative agreed but said 
there was further evidence which would be obtained and faxed. Asked that the case 
be referred back for ADR next week and I agreed.
 ● This was a new claim from a 56-year-old woman who has recently developed 
diabetes which was not well controlled. She also has a back problem. The medical 
evidence indicates that she has had at least three hypoglycaemic attacks when she 
has lost consciousness with no warning and been taken into hospital. She is never left 
alone because she could lose consciousness without warning. I rang PDCS and said 
that in my view a Tribunal would award Middle Rate Care for a short award. They will 
consider this and let us know if they will revise the award.
Examples of unsuitable cases
 ● A 29-year-old with depression and back pain. New claim, no award. GP report largely 
unsupportive of an award. Outcome unclear on the papers. Unsuitable for ADR and 
should proceed to oral hearing as requested.
 ● A 52-year-old with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. New claim, no award. 
Conflict of evidence and outcome in papers unclear. Oral hearing requested. 
Unsuitable for ADR.
 ● This was a new claim by a 57-year-old female who suffered from diabetes and 
obesity. She described limitations in walking, using the toilet, bathing, dressing, and 
had problems cooking. A medical examination report did not support an award. In her 
letter of appeal she disagreed with the assessment. There was a conflict of evidence 
so unsuitable for ADR; the matter was to proceed to an oral hearing.
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Once identified as suitable, the DTJs’ overall approach to conducting the ENE review was 
consistent, focusing on a more in-depth review of the evidence as summarised by one DTJ:
“I look at the major key points in the evidence, I look at the decision, I look at 
whether or not there is a conflict of evidence, whether or not there has been 
evidence that has come to light since the decision-maker, the first person who 
made the decision, and I look at all the various factors that might lead me to 
conclude that one or other party is likely to lose if the matter went to a tribunal to 
end up unsuccessful” 
(District Tribunal Judge)
However, there was some potential variation in the amount of time that DTJs allocated to 
conducting ENE, particularly as a result of the pressure to deal with a sufficient number of 
cases on each ADR day. One DTJ reported that DTJs would read the case papers as they 
would if they were going to be sitting on a tribunal. Another DTJ acknowledged that it was 
only possible for a skim read given the pressure to get through cases. DTJs also reported 
that cases became quicker to deal with as they became more experienced with the ADR 
process. One DTJ stated that they learned that, if they immediately went to the section of the 
file covering the PDCS’s position on the case, to review the reasoning for their decision, they 
could quickly determine if there were clear inconsistencies.
Overall, the time spent on ENE was dependent on the complexity and issues of the case 
and the amount of evidence available for review. DTJs acknowledged that first claims tended 
to be quicker as there was less evidence or history and it tended to be a single-issue case. 
A renewal case or a case that had perhaps been subject to supersession10 and had more 
history typically took longer to conduct ENE as 
“it’s not simply a person seeking to show that they are disabled, there are more 
legal tests to be applied when a person has been awarded a benefit and it’s been 
removed” 
(District Tribunal Judge)
DTJs also recognised that cases might take longer where they required more thinking about 
the medical conditions involved, sometimes involving reference to medical reference books. 
Each DTJ had one day set aside each week to review, process and act upon the ADR cases. 
This included undertaking the ENE review and contacting the losing party where appropriate. 
Seven cases per week were considered by DTJs to be a manageable caseload, with an 
average case taking 40-45 minutes to appraise. DTJs were clear that more complicated 
cases could take as long as two hours to review but the most straightforward and clear-cut 
cases could be processed in as little as 25 minutes. 
10 Supersession is where a benefit decision is changed because of a change in appellant circumstances.
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DTJs reported that there had been instances where workflow or availability of a DTJ had 
meant that the single day set aside for ENE had been inadequate and not all cases could 
be reviewed within the week received. Generally, in the following weeks, the outstanding 
cases were dealt with. As mentioned earlier, in an isolated three per cent of cases, appeals 
may have been put back into the ‘normal’ appeal process. This was an important point to 
emerge from the evaluation and potentially had implications if the ADR process were rolled 
out more widely. If there was more pressure to deal with a greater number of cases, DTJs 
may not be able to devote sufficient time to identifying suitable cases. This would lead to 
fewer opportunities to achieve the benefits of ADR by avoiding a hearing or preventing an 
adjournment. Alternatively, if the process was implemented as part of the normal procedures 
then more resources might be available to address any backlog. But, the ENE process would 
need to result in sufficiently fewer hearings to offset the additional costs.
Contacting the potential losing party
Following the ENE review, the second stage of the ADR process involved the DTJ contacting 
the party who, in their opinion, was either likely to lose the appeal or where there was no 
clear losing party but they wanted to discuss the case. The following sections explore the 
purpose and process for this telephone call from the perspectives of DTJs, PDCS, appellants 
and welfare rights groups.
Purpose of the call
Emerging from the interviews with the four DTJs involved in the ADR pilot was a consistent 
view that the purpose of the telephone call differed dependent on whether the recipient of the 
call was the PDCS, appellants or their representatives. When the telephone call was made 
to the PDCS, there was an acknowledgement by DTJs that the purpose of the call was to 
highlight to the PDCS why the DTJ thought the tribunal was likely to revise the decision made 
and to invite the PDCS to reconsider their decision. 
When the DTJ believed that the appeal was likely to fail, he or she contacted the appellant, 
the purpose being to explain their view and suggest actions that the appellant could take, 
either to withdraw the case or how to strengthen the case for the hearing. For example, the 
DTJ might suggest that the appellant send in any further evidence or that they seek advice or 
focus on the specific issues the tribunal would need to consider. There was, however, a wider 
view taken by DTJs and effectively a secondary purpose of the call to appellants or their 
representatives. DTJs acknowledged that, in some circumstances, they utilised the telephone 
call to appellants to discuss with appellants the benefits of attending an oral hearing, where 
they had opted for a paper hearing. The telephone call also provided an opportunity to clarify 
any misunderstandings that appellants had about the tribunal hearing, such as the option to 
bring friends or family, the specific locations of hearing venues or access to support such as 
interpreters. Although not the primary purpose of the call, DTJs also recognised the benefit in 
terms of the personal contact with appellants. As this DTJ described: 
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“A peripheral benefit is that appellants appreciate the kind of human face of the whole 
system, which is very bureaucratic and very difficult for some people to handle” 
(District Tribunal Judge)
However, there was some concern from DTJs about whether these wider purposes of the 
telephone call were cost-effective, particularly where telephone calls were made when it was 
clear that the hearing would not be avoided. As this DTJ summarised: 
“whether that is a benefit which really justifies the time and cost is another matter, 
but I think they are spin offs which are useful” 
(District Tribunal Judge)
There is an argument that these functions could as easily and more cost-effectively be dealt 
with by representative and advocacy agencies. 
Process DTJs go through to make call
Whether calls were made to the PDCS or appellants, the process followed entailed the 
Tribunals Service administrative clerk making initial contact with the recipient to inform them 
that the DTJ wanted to speak with them about the case. This ensured that the DTJ’s time 
was used most effectively. 
Calls to PDCS
In preparation for the call to the PDCS, DTJs ensured they had notes from the ENE review. 
These included listing specific reasons, questions, inconsistencies and missing data which 
caused their opinion that the PDCS was the likely losing party. This was often necessary to 
refer the PDCS to specific pages or sections of the case file during the discussion.
Overall, DTJs appeared to take a subtle approach to opening the conversations with PDCS 
representatives as it was felt inappropriate to explicitly criticise the original decision. Typically, 
the PDCS representative who received the telephone calls was a Decision-Maker Manager 
to facilitate more open and productive discussions. DTJs acknowledged that they would 
have expected a more hostile reaction from the PDCS if they were speaking directly to the 
decision-maker who made the original decision. 
DTJs thought it likely that the PDCS, during preparation for the call with the DTJ, would have 
identified similar issues with the original decision and thus anticipate or readily take on board 
the DTJs views. Overall, DTJs reported that the PDCS reaction was good and they were 
open to reviewing the information provided and reconsidering their judgement. In the most 
part, on reviewing the cases prior to taking calls from the DTJ, the PDCS reported that the 
review had highlighted errors in the processing or alerted them to the same weakness with 
the original decision. The result of this call was, therefore, expected by DTJs to be a swift 
resolution and overturn of the decision in favour of the appellant. 
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PDCS views of the call
Generally PDCS staff members were positive about the opportunity to speak to a DTJ. This 
element of the ADR process was recognised by PDCS as offering a liaison opportunity to 
build relationships with DTJs. Specifically, it was recognised as having benefits in terms of 
quality assurance, allowing PDCS to collect an independent view and insight into the way 
they looked at cases. One PDCS staff member thought that given the low number of phone 
calls received by PDCS, it was too small-scale to collect information that could be used to 
improve the way they operate.
For the majority of PDCS staff, when a call was received from the DTJ, an open dialogue 
followed. Generally PDCS acknowledged that they had reached the same conclusion as 
DTJs when they reviewed these cases. This might have resulted in this easier conversation. 
PDCS staff, however, reported an isolated example where the PDCS and DTJ were in 
disagreement during the call. The PDCS member of staff felt that the DTJ’s view took 
precedence over their own and somewhat put into question their expertise. The final decision 
as to whether the case was reconsidered and revised or not, however, lay with the PDCS 
staff member.
On a practical level, PDCS staff reported some issues with the process for preparing and 
receiving the call from the DTJ. The Tribunals Service administrator provided notice of all 
cases which were part of the ENE process before it was clear whether the DTJ was going 
to follow this up with a call to PDCS. Some PDCS staff, particularly at the beginning of the 
pilot, expressed some frustration that they had reviewed a case on notification from the DTJ 
that it was being considered but had not received a call about the case. Other PDCS staff, 
however, were more pragmatic, and did not prepare the case until they were notified by 
the Tribunals Service administrative staff that they would be receiving a call from the DTJ. 
Typically 30 minutes notice was given which was felt to be sufficient time to review the case. 
This notice and the fact that calls were relatively short meant most PDCS staff did not feel 
that the call interrupted their normal duties.
Overall, PDCS had expected larger volumes of calls as a result of ADR. This was partly 
because of the way the process was marketed but also because of the number of cases they 
were advised the DTJ was considering. PDCS staff were not aware whether this low volume 
was due to a greater number of calls to appellants, or a high number of cases where a clear 
losing party could not be identified at the ENE review stage. The low volume of calls to the 
PDCS and the lack of knowledge about the outcome of ENE led to some questions about the 
effectiveness of ADR on the part of PDCS. While there was some surprise and frustration by 
PDCS staff about the relative lack of calls, this was also viewed positively by one PDCS staff 
member: 
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“In one way I’m glad, because I’m hoping we are progressing, we are getting 
things right. And I’m hoping that things will improve even more, so I haven’t had 
as many as I thought, which I think is a good sign” 
(PDCS staff member)
Other PDCS staff reported that they would welcome greater communication about the 
outcome of cases, particularly for cases they were not contacted about, to support their 
confidence in the ADR process.
Calls to appellants
DTJs reported having to take a more open approach to the calls with appellants. This 
involved a greater degree of listening to gauge appellants’ understanding or otherwise of the 
nature of the case and the process, and to point out matters relevant to their case.
Initially, the DTJs focused on explaining the purpose and context of the call to the appellant 
so that they were clear about what could and could not happen as a result of it. The DTJs 
thought this opening was important in putting the appellant at ease and allowing them to 
‘acclimatise’ to the idea of talking about their case over the phone to a stranger. The DTJs 
then outlined the reasons for viewing the case as weak. While in some cases it may have be 
appropriate for the appellant to withdraw the case, DTJs alternatively might have suggested 
that the appellant send in any further evidence or that they seek advice or focus on the 
specific issues the tribunal would need to consider. DTJs recognised this benefit of the 
telephone call in playing a proactive part in strengthening the body of evidence submitted 
and the presentation of evidence in a hearing. As this DTJ summarised: 
“I should think about 50% of the time you can move it on in some way like they’ll 
bring someone with them or they’ll come when it was going to be a paper case, 
they’ll come and make it an oral case, or they’ll get their doctor to give something, 
a letter or something?” 
(District Tribunal Judge)
The DTJs’ experience of making the call to appellants, whatever the opinion given, was 
positive. DTJs reported that difficulties, in terms of the appellant not accepting what the 
DTJ was saying, most typically arose when the crux of the case was a point of law that the 
appellant could not comprehend. Appellants, however, were focused on a range of difficulties 
that they perceived entitled them to support for care or mobility. An example of this given by a 
DTJ was a mother claiming on behalf of a child who had a range of care needs. The DTJ had 
to explain during the telephone call that to claim DLA she had to prove intelligence deficiency. 
The mother did not accept this as she was more focused on other difficulties which she 
perceived proved her case.
There were 32 instances where it was not possible for the DTJ to make phone contact with 
the appellant, despite up to three attempts to do so. Where possible a message was left and 
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the appellant had the opportunity to schedule an appointment through the administrator. The 
case was then be re-referred so the DTJ could attempt recontact at the following session. If 
not, or there was still no response, at this point the DTJ either sent a letter, or the case went 
on to hearing without intervention. 
Appellant views of call
Of the appellants or representatives who had received a telephone call from the DTJ, the 
overall view of the call was positive even where the DTJ’s opinion was that the appellant’s 
case was weak.
The tone of the calls was generally well received, and various appellants had noted the 
sympathetic tone and manner adopted by the DTJs. For example: 
“He was helpful, his tone was… it wasn’t a biased one, it wasn’t like for me or it 
wasn’t for the DLA, it was yes just quite helpful” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
There was only one isolated case where the tone of the call was considered by the appellant 
to be ‘brash’. However, the recommendation for this appellant was for them to drop the case. 
This potentially overshadowed the appellant’s view of the call, particularly as the case was 
subsequently successful at a hearing. The confidential nature of the call was also clear to 
appellants: 
“He said to me everything I’ve said will not go any further, you know, it’s all 
confidential so I knew that, I could talk to him about anything. And when I came 
off the phone I actually did feel a bit more, you know, this has helped me a bit and 
maybe there could be a chance that it might be okay” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
Other appellants considered it was helpful to simply have someone to talk the case through 
with, who would consider their experience and listen to their perspective. Where an appellant 
had no representative or active support in preparing his/her case, the opportunity to discuss 
the case with the DTJ also reassured some appellants that all the information required for the 
appeal was provided. Related to this, calls were particularly valued and increased levels of 
satisfaction where they provided directions: 
“The DTJ just explained what I had to go and get anything else I could use to 
back up what I was saying, to gather all the information ...so yes it was very, very 
helpful, otherwise I would have probably been sat there and thought what now?” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
Where dissatisfaction was expressed with the DTJ’s telephone call it tended to be because 
appellants did not like the advice being given or where they felt something had gone wrong 
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in the whole appeal process in terms of taking too long, or administrative issues with PDCS’s 
paperwork. For example, one appellant stated that he was not very happy about the phone 
call in these terms, 
“I got a phone call off the chairman basically advising me not to go onto the 
appeal because I was weak within my evidence and I thought that was a bit 
outrageous you know” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
Other appellants, however, disliked the impersonality of process, and the fact that contact 
was a one-off. For some people, the impersonality of a phone call exacerbated a feeling of 
the claim and appeal process generally being too impersonal. One appellant felt that contact 
should also be face to face as his appeal was ‘a sensitive issue’. They stated that: 
“I would have like somebody like you rang me up this morning and say you’re 
going to be here, somebody to ring me up and say is it possible for me to come 
round and discuss your DLA. Yes, by all means. Instead of talking to somebody 
over a telephone, complete stranger that you don’t even know” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
Whereas some appellants felt a phone call was impersonal, others preferred a telephone 
conversation because they had difficulties in reading and writing. The ADR process was 
designed with reference to the inclusion of those with literacy or language needs. One 
Bexleyheath appellant felt the phone call suited his needs very well because he was not 
literate, and could not read the papers he received. He was given advice about the medical 
evidence he needed by the DTJ – something that he could not determine from the papers he 
had received – and something which he appreciated. 
There were isolated examples of appellants who had missed the calls from the DTJ or who 
were not able to take a telephone call on the day that they were called, as they wanted 
to involve their representative. For these appellants, this made them feel that they lacked 
the opportunity to actively participate in ADR and they were not in control of their situation. 
To illustrate, one appellant missed the DTJ call and the case then proceeded to a paper 
hearing, without apparently being re-referred to the DTJ the following week for a subsequent 
attempt to contact the appellant. This appellant had wanted to use ADR but also wanted 
their representative to be actively involved in the case and the hearing. Nevertheless, this 
appellant was still supportive of the process but it had made him lose some confidence in it. 
The representative, who was also a family friend and present during the research interview 
with the appellant, had used ADR in the past and, despite this experience, probably would 
still advise people to use the process. 
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“This has rather shaken my confidence, as I say I hope this is an isolated case 
and somebody has just got it very wrong. I think in the main I would still advise 
people to go down that route because of its independence, because of its speed 
and because of its informality” 
(Sutton opt-in, words of appellant’s representative)
Calls to representatives
There was agreement amongst DTJs that when telephone calls were made to 
representatives the approach to the call differed again. Specifically, where appellants had 
nominated a professional representative these calls were handled differently to those directly 
with appellants. Specifically, DTJs reported that they were more open in the conversation and 
said more explicitly that the appellant’s case would be likely to fail at a tribunal. Overcoming 
the difficulty reported above, DTJs could make greater reference to legislation during calls to 
professional representatives, as they were typically more knowledgeable in this area.
Welfare rights group views of telephone calls to the losing party
Amongst the welfare rights group representatives interviewed for the evaluation, there 
were no examples of individuals who had received a call from the DTJ as a professional 
representative for an appellant. This might be because welfare rights groups did not act as 
formal representatives or because appellants did not seek advice until after the call was 
received. There was a view expressed that a welfare rights group representative would be 
‘embarrassed’ if they received a call from the DTJ to say a case was not strong enough as it 
was the representative’s job to know how to present a strong case.
As such, welfare rights group representatives’ views focused on the general process of calls 
being made to appellants as the potential losing party of the appeal. There was recognition 
from welfare rights group representatives that for appellants the call from the DTJ could come 
‘out of the blue’. Therefore, it was important that appellants did not make a hasty decision to 
withdraw as they might still benefit from attending an oral hearing. Representatives felt that 
it was important that in all cases the DTJ advised the appellant to get some advice before 
making this decision. Welfare rights group representatives also advocated that DTJs should 
recommend, or at least name, a number of agencies in the appellant call when advising 
appellants to seek further advice: 
“I think they would really need to stress to people that they should go and get 
advice on this and not make a hasty decision. It would be helpful if they had 
sources of advice they could suggest to them” 
(Sutton welfare rights group representative) 
An alternative suggestion, to ensure appellants were effectively supported to make 
appropriate decisions, was that the outcome of ENE be put in a letter with an option to call to 
discuss further at a convenient time for the appellant.
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This section covered the evaluation of the main processes involved in delivery of the pilot, and 
focused specifically on conducting the ENE review and telephone calls to the potential losing party. 
The next section provides quantitative information about the scale of the pilot and key indicators. 
Pilot process: quantitative delivery findings
This section covers the evaluation of the main processes involved in delivery of the pilot, 
focusing specifically on conducting the ENE review and telephone calls to the potential 
losing party. Specifically it considers the evaluation evidence to contribute to answering the 
following key research question: 
 ● Does ADR result in swifter and/or more proportionate resolution of cases?
Figures in some tables and charts presented throughout this chapter may not sum to 100% 
due to multiple responses or rounding (figures are rounded to the nearest whole per cent). 
Sample tolerance tests11 were applied to the percentage results of the quantitative data. 
Findings are typically presented in respect of the pilot overall. They are only broken down 
into subgroups of the two broad pilot areas or by the different route-ways that cases could 
take through the ADR process only where the differences are large enough to be robust. The 
statistical significance tests that have been applied to these results are given in the tables in 
Appendix C, along with the full results for each pilot area.
Key findings
 ● Just over three-quarters (78%) of all appellants who received the ADR letter and opt-
in form opted into the ADR process between September 2007 and the end of January 
2009. 
 ● Only 25% of all opt-in cases were identified as having been subject to both stages of 
the ADR process.
 ● Seventy-one per cent of all opt-in cases were subject to only the first stage of the 
ADR process, i.e. they had an ENE review but were considered ‘unsuitable’ for further 
ADR activities, although some had subsequent beneficial interventions in the form of 
directions issued.
 ● There were only three per cent of opt-in cases that were subject to no parts of the 
ADR process because of a lack of time or resources. 
Identifying a sample for analysis
The first task towards analysing the spreadsheets produced by the ADR pilot was to identify 
a suitable sample of cases for analysis. Cases were entered onto the spreadsheet on receipt 
of the pre-enquiry form, with additional information added as the case progressed. The 
11 These tests show the possible variation that might be anticipated because a sample, rather than the 
entire population, was examined. Sampling tolerances vary with the size of the sample and the size of the 
percentage results.
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sample for analysis was drawn from both non-opt-in and opt-in cases but only cases with a 
clear outcome or evidence that the case had concluded (for example, a decision from the 
hearing or dates when the case was withdrawn or lapse were included). A number of cases 
from the spreadsheets were consequently excluded from the sample. While they had opted 
in to the ADR process, they had not been concluded by the end of January 2009, the point 
the spreadsheets were provided. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the total number of cases 
in each pilot area contained on the spreadsheets at the end of the pilot and the proportion 
which were suitable for analysis.
Table 2.1:  Total cases and sample sizes available for analysis per pilot area
Opt-in cases Non-opt in cases
Sutton and Bexleyheath
Total flow of cases: 721 Total flow of cases: 843
Sample for analysis: 521 Sample for analysis: 729
Bristol and Cardiff
Total flow of cases: 806 Total flow of cases: 628
Sample for analysis: 457 Sample for analysis: 374
Overall, therefore, 1,527 cases opted into the ADR pilot across the four pilot areas between 
September 2007 and the end of January 2009. Of these, 978 (64%) of these cases were 
suitable for analysis as they had concluded. There were 1,471 non-opt-in cases in total, with 
1,103 (74%) suitable for analysis. 
Profile of opt-in and non-opt-in cases
At the point of receiving the spreadsheets for analysis, the evaluation team was not able 
to distinguish which eligible cases had made an active choice not to opt-in and which were 
assigned to be a non-opt-in case. Some people did not have the opportunity to opt-in as 
they were not sent the opt-in form initially, as a result of early difficulties in the administration 
of information on ADR. A more accurate way to calculate the opt-in rate to the pilot was, 
therefore, pursued using data supplied by the Tribunals Service, which recorded the number 
of letters issued in each area and the number of appellants opting in. Using this data the opt-
in rate was calculated as 78%. It could be expected that the opt-in rate would rise when only 
examining data from the point (November 2008) the administration of the letter transferred 
to be the responsibility of the Tribunals Service. At this point, staff perceived this would help 
with the consistency of the letter being sent out. However, the opt-in rate for this period was 
only 52% suggesting other factors influenced the rate of opt-in to the pilot.
This overall sample of cases for analysis had the following characteristics.
 ● The majority of the opt-in cases (95% or 931 cases) were related to appeals against 
DLA claims. Only five per cent (47 cases) related to AA claims. Non-opt-in cases had the 
same profile, again with 95% (1,046 cases) being appeals against DLA claims and five 
per cent (58 cases) AA claims. 
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 ● Based on the information recorded on the spreadsheets on the nature of appellants’ 
primary disability, the majority of appellants (66%, 649 cases) who opted into ADR 
had physical health impairments. The remaining 34% (329 cases) had mental health 
impairments. Non-opt-in cases demonstrated a higher proportion of appellants with a 
physical impairment (80%, 878 cases) with the remaining 20% (225 cases) having a 
mental health impairment. For the purpose of this analysis, the nature of the first key 
disability was used to establish the main health impairment. However, it should be noted 
that typically a second key disability was recorded for a large proportion of appellants. 
So in practice appellants faced multiple types of health impairment, in some cases both 
physical and mental health impairments. 
 ● At the time of returning the pre-hearing enquiry form, appellants were asked whether 
they wanted to opt for a paper or oral hearing. Using this information it was possible to 
calculate that of the opt-in cases 74% (723 cases) of appellants had opted for an oral 
hearing and the remaining 26% (254 cases) for a paper hearing. The proportions for 
non-opt-in cases were similar, with 77% (849 cases) opting for an oral hearing and 23% 
(254 cases) for a paper hearing. These characteristics were subject to change, however, 
as DTJs could issue a direction to an appellant asking them to reconsider their election 
of a paper hearing particularly if they felt an oral hearing would allow an appellant to 
provide better evidence to support their appeal.
Within the opt-in samples for analysis, there were only a small proportion of cases which were 
subject to both stages of the ADR process, namely the ENE review and the telephone call to the 
potential losing party. There was a relatively high proportion of cases (71%) which were subject 
only to the first stage of the ADR process, the ENE review. This could still have positive outcomes 
in terms of the issuing of directions. There was also a small proportion (3%) where no elements of 
the ADR process were carried out, due to a lack of time or insufficient resources. The sample of 
opt-in cases, therefore, could be broken down to the following three types of cases.
 ● Stage one ADR process: cases where an ENE review only was conducted as the case 
was identified as not suitable for the second stage of the ADR process as no losing party 
could be identified. Some of these cases had further intervention in the form of additional 
directions. 
 ● Stage one and two ADR process: cases which went through ENE, had a losing party 
identified and a DTJ made a telephone call to the losing party.
 ● No ADR process: opt-in cases where ENE was not carried out as there were 
insufficient resources or lack of time.
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Table 2.2 details the proportion of these three types of opt-in cases evident across the 
pilot as a whole. The following sections then explore these types of cases in more detail 
and examine the ADR activities undertaken for the different types of cases. It should be 
noted that differentiation between stage one and both stage ADR process cases was only 
determined at the point of the ENE review, rather than randomly assigned at the opt-in stage. 
For this reason, it is not possible to use these subsets of opt-in cases for direct comparison 
with non-opt-in cases in any subsequent reporting of analysis. It is possible that the different 
types of opt-in cases may demonstrate some core differentiating characteristics which could 
undermine a direct comparison with non-opt-in cases.
Table 2.2:  Profile of opt-in cases
Stage one and 
two ADR process 
(ENE & telephone 
call to losing 
party) 
Stage one ADR 
process  
(ENE only)
No ADR process 
(Insufficient 
resources/lack of 
time) Total opt-in cases
Total all areas 249 (25%) 697 (71%) 32 (3%) 978 (100%)
ADR activities
Stage one and two ADR process 
As summarised in Table 2.2, there were 249 opt-in cases overall which were subject to ENE, 
had a losing party identified and a telephone call made by the DTJ. This suggested that both 
stages of the ADR process happened in only a quarter of all opt-in cases. 
Table 2.3 shows the profile of the losing parties following ENE identified by the recipient of 
the telephone call from the DTJ. There was a slightly higher proportion of calls being made to 
the PDCS as the losing party rather than appellants or their representatives.
Table 2.3:  Profile of telephone calls made by DTJs to appellants and PDCS 
Appellant 
contacted by DTJ 
(Proportion of 
stage one and two 
ADR cases where 
contact made)
Representative 
contacted by DTJ 
(Proportion of 
stage one and two 
ADR cases where 
contact made)
PDCS contacted 
by DTJ 
(Proportion of 
cases where 
contact made)
Total stage one 
and two ADR 
cases
Total all areas 76 (31%) 38 (15%) 135 (54%) 249 (100%)
Stage one ADR process
It is evident from Table 2.2 that the highest proportion of cases in total (71%) were subject to 
only stage one of the ADR process. As such they had an ENE review (and in some cases also 
directions) but were considered ‘unsuitable’ for further ADR activities. The following table examines 
the reasons recorded on the spreadsheets as to why these cases were considered ‘unsuitable’.
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Table 2.4:  Reasons that ADR opt-in cases were ‘unsuitable’ to progress to 
stage 2 
Reason for unsuitability Number of cases
Outcome unclear 537 (84%)
Complex appeal 51 (8%)
Other 37 (6%)
Lack of time to conduct ENE 10 (2%)
Disability issues/language issues 7 (1%)
Total 642* (100%)
* Figure is lower than total stage one ADR cases as not all cases had a reason recorded.
It was clear that the principal reason cases were considered unsuitable for stage 2 was 
because the outcome from the case was unclear, effectively that a losing party could not be 
identified with a reasonable degree of confidence. This was the reason recorded in 84% of all 
stage one ADR opt-in cases. Typically, these cases related to appellants who had a physical 
impairment and were due to have an oral hearing. This fitted with the suggestion from DTJs 
during the qualitative interviews that they would often identify cases where the complexity of 
the points of the cases meant it was best that they were resolved at an oral hearing rather 
than be subject to further intervention from the ADR process. There was, however, clear 
evidence from the spreadsheet analysis that despite these cases being identified as not 
suitable for stage 2, the ENE exercise led to intervention in the form of directions. 
Overall, analysis of the dates when cases were referred for ENE suggests that DTJs were 
largely efficient in conducting ENE. The majority of cases (85%) overall were reviewed 
on their first referral to the DTJ, with only 14% being looked at on the second referral. 
The spreadsheets did not include a field for recording the date of a third referral so it was 
not possible to assess the proportion of cases where this happened. Tribunals Service 
administrative clerks suggested in their interviews that this happened in isolated cases. 
If DTJs ran out of time on the specific ADR day, they sought to prevent cases becoming no-
ADR process cases by having them re-referred in subsequent weeks. The majority of cases 
which were re-referred to DTJs appear to have been dealt with the following week, as the 
average time between the first and second referral was calculated as six working days. There 
were isolated examples of cases, however, which had a longer period before re-referral, in 
one case 42 working days. Interviews with Tribunal Service administrative clerks suggested 
that this was due to directions having been given by the DTJ and the need to wait for receipt of 
further evidence, such as a medical examination report, before re-referring the case to the DTJ 
for ENE. This is explored further below, in the context of the overall speed of case resolution. 
There was no evidence of prioritising particular types of cases for re-referral. The cases which 
were referred for a second time were largely representative of the overall breakdown of oral 
and paper hearings and appellants with physical and mental health impairments.
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No ADR process
Across the pilot as a whole, there were only a small number of opt-in cases (32 cases or 
three per cent of the total opt-in sample, see Table 2.2) that were subject to no parts of the 
ADR process because of a lack of time or resources. Given the small sample size, it was not 
possible to robustly break down this group of cases to examine specific patterns in terms of 
their characteristics. However, this group included both cases due to be resolved by paper and 
oral hearings and also included appellants with both physical and mental health impairment. 
This suggested that this potential filtering of cases because of a lack of time or resources was 
done randomly and not based on specific characteristics of cases or appellants. 
The analysis examined whether there was an increase in the proportion of opt-in cases 
not being subject to the ADR process because of a lack of resources or time when the 
geographies of the pilot areas were widened. Evidence from the qualitative interviews with 
Tribunals Service staff and DTJs suggested that there was a period where DTJ capacity 
was an issue. However, analysis of the data did not show that this manifested itself in any 
noticeable increase in the number of no-ADR process cases. The time periods when these 
cases were not looked at (due to a lack of time) did not correspond specifically to when the 
extended pilot areas came on stream, or the months during summer 2008 when interviews 
suggested that DTJ capacity was stretched. The fact that opt-in cases were typically re-
referred to DTJs the following week if they ran out of time to look at any cases in a given 
week, could also explain the relatively low number of cases here. 
Where opt-in cases did not experience any ADR process activities as a result of a lack of 
resources or time, they were effectively treated as non-opt-in cases and were listed for a 
hearing as normal. Although only a small number of cases, this could present a potential 
issue of undermining appellants’ confidence, particularly where they had made an active 
choice and were expecting their case to be affected by ADR. There were only limited 
instances (6 cases) where these cases were subject to directions that may have assisted 
in progressing the cases. Typically these directions were to confirm with appellants whether 
they would prefer a paper or oral hearing as the pre-enquiry form had not been returned. 
This section covered the evaluation of the main processes involved in delivery of the pilot. 
The next section examines the administrative processes associated with the ADR pilot. 
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Pilot process: ADR administrative processes
This section examines the administrative processes associated with the ADR pilot, 
specifically reporting on the additional administrative activities associated with the process, 
some operational issues identified through the pilot and examination of any evidence that the 
choice of pilot area was impacting explicitly on the delivery of the pilot. It provides evidence 
in response to the following key research question: 
 ● Were there any other impacts of ADR?
Key findings
 ● The implementation and operation of the different elements of the ADR process required 
the Tribunals Service to adopt a number of specific administrative practices or tasks 
undertaken by administrative clerks that were additional to the traditional process.
 ● The most onerous of these extra tasks were principally related to the pilot evaluation 
exercise. If the process is continued more widely, these can be removed allowing a 
more manageable administrative process. 
 ● Operational issues concerning administrating the opt-in letter were resolved following 
the reforms introduced under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
 ● The interviews with Tribunals Service staff, DTJs, PDCS staff and appellants did not 
reveal any substantial evidence that the choice of pilot area was impacting explicitly 
on the delivery of the pilot. 
Staffing the ADR pilot
A small dedicated team of administrative clerks was used in both pilot sites to process and 
manage ADR appeals. The rationale for this approach was that ADR was a new process so 
it was felt a small team would deal with it better. There was an acknowledgement from senior 
Tribunals Service staff, however, that the administrative clerks chosen to support the ADR 
pilot were the ‘best people’ and the most open to new practices. An issue for any wider roll 
out of the process will be to ensure that the administrative staff allocated to conduct these 
processes are as effective. 
Differences between ADR administrative process and traditional process
The implementation and operation of the different elements of the ADR process required the 
Tribunals Service to adopt a number of specific administrative practices or tasks undertaken 
by administrative clerks that were additional to the traditional process. These additional tasks 
included the following.
 ● Contacting, by telephone, appellants who did not return the opt-in form. Tribunals 
Service staff in Bristol did this from the beginning of the pilot while it was tried in Sutton 
for only a short period. This process was stopped once the flow of cases increased and 
judicial capacity to deal with them was reached.
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 ● Attaching an additional folder to ADR cases for the purpose of collecting information 
relating to the ADR processes. This folder was removed once the case proceeded to a 
hearing, to ensure there was no way in which the tribunal panel could identify that the 
case had been subject to ADR.
 ● Sorting and arranging the case files to be sent up to DTJs on the ADR day.
 ● Sending an email to PDCS to alert them to the cases to be looked at by a DTJ that 
week.
 ● Entering the case and ADR details on the spreadsheet created for the purpose of the pilot 
evaluation. This task was repeated at key stages of the cases’ progression through the 
appeal, such as at the start of the appeal, after ENE, and/or when extra evidence came in. 
 ● Collating statistics on the number of cases, ENEs and telephone calls for a weekly 
report to the pilot steering group.
 ● Being available on the ADR day to set up DTJ telephone calls with PDCS or appellants.
 ● Responding to directions recommended by the DTJ after ENE. There was an 
acknowledgement from administrative clerks, however, that this task may happen in the 
traditional process after the hearing. With ADR this task typically happened earlier and 
there was an increase in the total number of directions issued under ADR than in the 
traditional process. 
There was a perception from administrative clerks involved with the ADR pilot that there was 
effectively a double handling of ADR cases as a result of the administrative systems adopted, 
particularly in terms of the logging and recording of case details. In the traditional process, 
when a case came in it was logged and listed, with a hearing date sent out to the appellant. 
For ADR cases, this initial logging also happened but it was then replicated with the details 
recorded both on the evaluation spreadsheet and additional red case file folder to distinguish 
an ADR case. There were strong feelings amongst some administrative clerks about this 
repetitive work: 
“I hate ADR, I can’t stand it. It’s just so time-consuming doing the ADR tasks. 
You’re rewriting it [details on spreadsheet and files] three, four, five times, so you 
know once you’ve done all of that it’s a good few hours” 
(Tribunals Service staff member)
More positively, however, the most onerous of these extra tasks were principally related to 
the pilot evaluation exercise and as such would be removed allowing a more manageable 
administrative process should the process be continued more widely. As this clerk perceived: 
“There’s a lot more work involved because of the spreadsheet and because of 
the weekly report. Getting rid of those two there’s still more work involved for 
ADR but it’s fairly manageable” 
(Tribunals Service staff member)
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Operational issues associated with ADR
Interviews with Tribunals Service staff revealed a number of operational issues associated 
with the ADR pilot.
Appellant opt-in
A key concern for Tribunals Service staff and DTJs was the consistency with which the ADR 
opt-in letter was included in submission packs sent to appellants during the initial stages 
of the pilot. Tribunals Service staff were able to see this inconsistency as weekly statistics 
were recorded by the Tribunals Service of the number of appeals received for a particular 
venue and the number of ADR letters sent out as a requirement of the pilot. Tribunals Service 
staff reported that they had met with PDCS teams, both those in Blackpool and the local 
processing sites in Bristol and Cardiff dealing with new claims, initially and subsequently. This 
sought to ensure that they were familiar with the instructions and process for issuing letters, 
specifically that letters need to be included in submission packs sent to appellants living in 
the eligible postcodes. Despite PDCS efforts to follow these procedures, a solution was not 
found to the inconsistent distribution of the ADR letters during the early part of the pilot. 
The reforms under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, however, meant 
responsibility for sending out the TAS1 (which was renamed the pre-enquiry form under the 
Act) was transferred to the Tribunals Service. A subsequent decision to keep the ADR form 
together with this form helped reduce the discrepancy of ADR letters not being sent with 
all submission packs. This change was perceived positively by Tribunals Service staff as a 
mechanism to increase confidence that appellants were receiving the ADR letter and had the 
opportunity to actively opt-in to the pilot: 
“What will help now is that we’re sending it out, so we know that it will go out 
and we will then know they’ve definitely had it but they’re not opting in for some 
reason, whereas when it was at the beginning of the project and even now, we 
still do not know if they’ve got the ADR form” 
(Tribunals Service staff member)
Tribunals Service staff also highlighted that the separation of the pre-enquiry form and 
ADR opt-in letter from the larger submission pack could help with visibility of the letter. This 
emerged as a potential reason for appellants not opting into the pilot. The timing of the 
appellant fieldwork meant it was not possible to examine this from an appellant perspective. 
Welfare rights group representatives, however, felt that their role to support appellants might 
be made more difficult if the pre-enquiry form came separately. Given the mental health 
conditions of some appellants, there was concern from welfare rights group representatives 
that appellants might not see the form if it arrived in a separate envelope and might attend 
advice appointments without this key piece of paperwork. It was felt that it might increase the 
propensity for appeals to be struck out because the pre-enquiry form was not returned in time. 
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Managing session capacity
Interviews indicated that from the start of the pilot, in the Sutton area (September 2007), all 
cases were listed as normal as soon as the appeal came in. This was before the case file 
went up for ADR. After a period of time it became clear that this process was undermining the 
management of listings and session capacity. Cases often had to be subsequently lifted out 
of the system when the ADR process resulted in directions being issued, or where the case 
was lapsed or withdrawn. 
From January 2008, at the start of the operation in Bristol, (the second pilot area to come 
on- stream), cases were only listed after ADR activities, in terms of ENE or a telephone 
call, were completed. This meant more effective management of lists and session capacity. 
There was some initial concern, however, from some administrative clerks that this practice 
of delaying listing dates would impact negatively on achievement of performance targets for 
waiting times. However, other administrative clerks did not consider delaying the listing until 
after ADR had a significant impact. They felt there was still sufficient time to hit the target 
if cases were subsequently dealt with efficiently. An issue arose, however, if cases were 
re-referred for ADR for a second or even third week if there was insufficient DTJ capacity 
to clear the cases in a particular week. Administrative clerks highlighted particular concern 
during summer 2008 where there was annual leave and sickness amongst DTJs which 
they perceived to have created a significant backlog of cases to be reviewed. In these 
circumstances, there was a negative impact on the efficient listing of cases to meet the 
target. If a direction was issued by a DTJ following ADR to request a medical examination 
report, this was also likely to further delay the listing of a case, with greater propensity to 
have a negative impact on the listing targets. In these circumstances, the case was re-
referred to the DTJ as a priority case once this further information was received. But often 
the waiting time for receipt of this information was such that it could cause a significant 
delay in the progress of a case through the ADR process. Administrative clerks recognised 
that this delay to a case might well have occurred in the traditional process. An external 
contractor provided the medical examination reports, so some delays were caused by this 
organisation not complying with the required timescales. But ADR had typically moved the 
task of requesting such reports to a stage where it was more likely to impact negatively on 
the achievement of listing targets. As this administrative clerk suggested: 
“If you think if an appeal came in say last week [in November], and the chairman 
had said to me today write out for an EMP, that case would not be listed until at 
least February, March next year, so it would have taken about three and a half 
months for it to get to the first tribunal” 
(Tribunals Service staff member)
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The ‘geographies’ of the pilot
The interviews with Tribunals Service staff, DTJs, PDCS staff and appellants did not reveal 
any substantial evidence that the choice of pilot area impacted explicitly on the delivery of 
the pilot. The only differentiated issue in terms of delivery, as a result of geography, was the 
existence of a local processing site for new claims made in Bristol and Cardiff. Tribunals 
Service staff recognised that this had facilitated a better working relationship with PDCS staff, 
particularly in facilitating the distribution of the initial ADR letter and opt-in form as the local 
site was smaller and had more stable staffing.
Evidence of different operation in the pilot areas
The timing of the launch of the pilot in the different geographies of the pilot areas meant that 
overall there was strong evidence of knowledge sharing and learning between the two broad 
pilot areas. For example, when the pilot was launched in Bristol, the administrative clerk from 
Sutton provided a training manual and opportunities for shadowing to the clerk conducting the 
role in Bristol. So while there were some examples of differing operation of the ADR pilot across 
the pilot areas initially, typically, common practices were in time adopted by the pilot areas.
There seemed to be some evidence of less well-briefed representative agencies in Bristol 
and Cardiff. This had implications for providing support to appellants in making decisions to 
opt-in. For Cardiff, this might be due to the timing of the dissemination of information on the 
ADR pilot, which happened in late 2007. This was with the expectation that Cardiff was to be 
one of the two initial pilot areas. 
Other differences in the operation of the pilot were identified but the reasons for these 
differing practices could not be attributed to delivery practices. For example, there was an 
acknowledgement by DTJs operating in the second pilot area (Bristol), that they had found 
that they were more likely to contact the PDCS for cases from the Cardiff area than they 
were for Bristol. DTJs felt this may be a consequence of differing decision-making across 
the PDCS teams dealing with cases from these geographies. This was not substantiated, 
however, by any evidence of a higher rate of decisions being overturned at the hearing stage 
for cases from this area.
Having explored in some detail the processes of the pilot, the following sections explore the 
impact of the pilot for users and the Tribunal Service.
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3. Pilot evaluation 
Pilot impact: quantitative output and outcomes
This section examines the quantitative outputs and outcomes from the ADR pilot using 
quantitative data produced from an analysis of the pilot spreadsheets. It provides evidence in 
response to the following key research questions.
 ● Does ADR result in swifter, more proportionate resolution of cases?
 ● Were there any other impacts of ADR?
 ● What impact did ADR have on the PDCS?
As noted earlier, the findings in this report were based on the assumption that opt-out and 
opt-in cases had similar characteristics. There remained a risk that this was not the case, and 
therefore findings related to the differences between the two groups should be treated with 
caution.
Key findings
 ● Analysis of the outputs of the opt-in cases compared to non-opt-in cases overall 
suggested that benefits were achieved by the ADR process in terms of:
 − reducing the number of cases proceeding to a hearing - 23% of all opt-in cases 
avoided a hearing compared to only nine per cent of non-opt-in cases, i.e. a 14 
percentage point lower rate of hearings; and, 
 − a nine percentage point lower rate of adjournments amongst ADR opt-in cases 
compared to non-opt-in cases. 
 ● Cases that were subject to the ADR process were overall resolved more slowly than 
non-opt-in cases - an average of 46 working days for all opt-in cases compared to 
42 days for non-opt-in cases. Where cases were subject to both stages of the ADR 
process, they were resolved in 34 working days on average. 
 ● There was little evidence to suggest that the ADR process as a whole impacted 
significantly on the benefit decisions achieved by appellants. The majority of opt-in 
and non-opt-in appellants (around two-thirds) were most likely to achieve the same 
level of benefit at the end of their appeal compared to the original claim decision. 
Around a third of cases achieved an increase in their benefit. The evidence suggested 
that DTJ views of the expected tribunal decision identified at the ENE stage were 
largely correct. 
 ● Interviews with Tribunals Service administrative clerks suggested that the issuing of 
directions at the ENE stage could be perceived to have a negative effect on achieving 
the performance target for listing cases. This was because this target was based on 
the period to first hearing and not the period to resolution of case.
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Review of pilot outputs
Profile of opt-in cases per the seven outcomes
As noted in the introduction, seven measurable outcomes had been identified as possible 
from the ADR opt-in process. In places, the spreadsheet did not include sufficient information 
to differentiate between some route-ways in achieving these outcomes. For example, 
information was not recorded on the spreadsheet to distinguish between the activities of 
PDCS after they were identified as the losing party and invited to reconsider their decision 
after or during a telephone call by the DTJ but ultimately did not revise their decision. 
Likewise, although the spreadsheet identified where PDCS lapsed cases, it was not possible 
to distinguish between the two routes the PDCS could take to reach this outcome, namely 
where the appellant was content with the outcome so the case lapsed or where they were 
not and the case lapsed as a new appeal was started. Table 3.1 summarises the profile of 
outcomes in the pilot in total.
Table 3.1:  Opt-in cases by outcome
Outcome Total opt-in cases-all 
areas
1 ENE not carried out insufficient resources - hearing as normal 32 (3%)
2 Not suitable for ADR or insufficient evidence to identify losing party, 
hearing as normal
558 (57%)
3 PDCS losing party but decision not revised 31 (3%)
4 PDCS losing party and appeal lapses 191 (19%)
5 Appellant losing party and appellant withdraws 42 (4%)
6 Appellant losing party, further evidence received but hearing as normal 55 (6%)
7 Appellant losing party but no action taken, hearing as normal 69 (7%)
Total cases per area 978 (100%)
It should be noted, however, that the profile of opt-in cases identified by specific outcome 
differed somewhat from the earlier identification of cases by the broad categories of stage 
one or stage one and two ADR process cases. This was because outcomes five to seven 
included all cases where the appellant was identified as the losing party, even where an 
actual telephone call was not made as the appellant could not be contacted. Stage one 
and two ADR cases, however, only include cases where an actual telephone call had been 
made to more clearly identify where additional intervention had taken place. The subsequent 
sections examine some of these broad outcomes, in terms of cases being withdrawn, lapsed 
or proceeding to a hearing as normal in more detail.
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Outcomes from opt-in and non-opt-in cases 
Withdrawals, lapses and hearings
Table 3.2 summarises the outcomes/route-ways identified above in terms of withdrawals, 
lapses and hearings to examine the outcomes associated with opt-in and non-opt-in cases.
Table 3.2:  Summary of opt-in and non-opt in case outcomes 
Non-opt in 
cases
Stage one and 
two ADR cases
Stage one ADR 
cases
All ADR opt-in 
cases*
Withdrawals 
(Outcome 5)
47 (4%) 17 (7%) 22 (3%) 39 (4%)
Lapses 
(Outcome 4)
50 (5%) 107 (43%) 75 (11%) 182 (19%)
Cases proceeding to 
a hearing & resolved 
(Outcomes 2, 3, 6 and 7)
1,006 (91%) 125 (50%) 600 (86%) 725 (77%)
Total resolved cases 1,103 (100%) 249 (100%) 697 (100%) 946* (100%)
* This figure excludes the 32 no ADR process cases (outcome 1b).
Analysis of the outcomes of the opt-in cases compared to non-opt-in cases overall suggested 
that benefits were achieved by the ADR process in reducing the number of cases proceeding 
to a hearing.
The majority of all non-opt-in cases (91%) proceeded and were resolved at a hearing with 
only a minority of non-opt-in cases withdrawn or lapsed, four per cent and five per cent 
respectively. This was in contrast to all opt-in cases where four per cent (39 cases) were 
withdrawn and some 19% (182 cases) were lapsed. Looking at the proportion of withdrawals 
and lapses together,12 there were a total of 23% or 221 of all opt-in cases where a hearing 
was avoided, compared to only nine per cent or 97 cases of non-opt-in cases. Tests of 
statistical significance showed the differences between these figures were robust but given 
the small sample sizes involved these figures must still be treated with some caution. 
Some 77% of all opt-in cases were still resolved at a hearing, which although still relatively 
high, represented a rate 14 percentage points lower of hearings amongst all opt-in cases 
compared to non-opt-in cases. 
Looking at the figures for cases which were subject to both stages of the ADR process only, 
50% or 125 cases still proceeded to a hearing but 43% (107 cases) were lapsed and seven 
per cent (17 cases) withdrawn. The total sample of cases was relatively small so the findings 
were not statistically significant. 
It was interesting to note that there were small numbers of lapses (11%) and withdrawals 
(3%) amongst stage one ADR cases. This supported the findings from the qualitative 
12 These two outcomes did not overlap and represent distinct outcomes - there were no cases which lapsed and 
were also withdrawn.
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interviews which suggested that PDCS were lapsing cases independently of speaking to a 
DTJ, either through a review of all cases in preparation for a call or as part of a wider quality 
assurance process instigated by the ADR process. In the stage one ADR cases which were 
withdrawn, appellants had not spoken to a DTJ so other factors or influences must account 
for this, for example, appellants could have simply changed their mind about proceeding with 
the appeal.
Adjournments and postponements
The analysis around adjournments also illustrated some potential benefits from the ADR 
process. In the non-opt-in sample overall, 18% of the total number of cases (195 from a 
total of 1,103 cases) were adjourned at the first hearing, compared to nine per cent (85 of a 
total of 946 cases) amongst the opt-in sample.13 As Table 3.3 shows, this suggested a nine 
percentage point lower rate of adjournments amongst ADR opt-in cases compared to non-
opt-in cases.14 
Table 3.3:  Proportion of cases adjourned at the first hearing
Stage one and two 
ADR opt-in cases 
(Outcome 3-10) 
(N=249 cases)
Stage one ADR 
opt-in cases 
(Outcome 2) 
(N=697 cases)
All ADR opt-in 
cases (N=946 
cases)
Non-opt in cases 
(N=1103 cases)
Total for all areas 22 (9%) 63 (9%) 85 (9%) 195 (18%)
When the opt-in figures were broken down into those which were subjected to ENE only (stage 
one ADR cases) and those which also had a telephone call made by a DTJ (stage one and two 
ADR process) the same rate of adjournments was seen. This fitted with the findings from the 
DTJ interviews which suggested that even if they did not make a phone call to a potential losing 
party DTJs sought to use ENE to intervene to progress the case. This was typically, through the 
issuing of directions, to avoid the case being adjourned when it reached a hearing. 
There were two main factors recorded on the spreadsheet as the reason for adjournment. 
Little difference was found between non-opt-in cases and all opt-in cases in the reasons 
cases were adjourned. In the majority of both opt-in and non-opt-in cases, 68% and 74% 
respectively, the hearing was adjourned so that directions could be issued. In a smaller 
proportion of cases, hearings were adjourned because of a lack of time. This was a reason 
in 20% of opt-in cases and 12% of non-opt-in cases that were adjourned. It was interesting 
to note that in 31 cases or 54% of the opt-in cases where the reason for adjournment was 
for directions to be issued, directions had already been issued as a result of ENE. In some 
of these cases, the original direction was to ask appellants about changing from a paper to 
an oral hearing or to seek advice. In other cases, however, it was not possible to reliably 
13 This excludes opt-in cases identified as no-ADR process cases which would skew the examination of the 
affect of the ADR process.
14 Tests show that this difference is significant.
46
determine from the spreadsheet why subsequent directions were issued and whether there 
was any repetition or relation between the directions issued. However, potential reasons 
identified through the interviews were that the additional evidence requested in the original 
direction did not arrive in time for the hearing or that additional issues emerged during the 
hearing which required further evidence before a decision was reached by the tribunal panel. 
The issuing of directions is explored further below.
Related to adjournments was the rate of postponements where an appellant asked for the 
hearing to be rescheduled prior to the day of the hearing. In total, there were 35 requests 
for opt-in cases to be postponed, with 26 or 74% of requests being granted. This represents 
only four per cent of the total sample of opt-in cases where postponements were requested 
and three per cent of the total opt-in cases where they were granted. Non-opt-in cases had 
a similar level of postponement requests and those being granted. Only three per cent of the 
total sample of non-opt-in cases had requested a postponement which was granted in 29 
cases or 85% of these cases. Given the small number of postponement requests which had 
a reason identified apart from ‘other’, it was not possible to confidently analyse the reasons 
requests were made. 
Issuing directions
A highly important finding from the analysis was the high proportion of opt-in cases where 
directions were issued before the hearing when compared to non-opt-in cases. It is clear 
from the figures in Table 3.4, that it was extremely rare for directions to be issued for non-
opt-in cases before a hearing, whereas directions were issued in 42% of all opt-in cases. 
Looking only at stage one ADR process cases, directions were issued in 46% of cases. This 
fitted with the qualitative interview findings which suggested that a DTJ was most likely to 
intervene in these cases by issuing directions as there was no further intervention in the form 
of a telephone call. Although these cases typically would then still proceed to a hearing, the 
intervention of the DTJ was intended to enhance the evidence available to the tribunal panel, 
potentially increasing the chances of avoiding an adjournment. 
Table 3.4:  Proportion of cases where directions were issued 
Stage one and 
two ADR opt-in 
cases (Outcome 
3-10) (N=249 
cases)
Stage one ADR 
opt-in cases 
(Outcome 2) 
(N=697 cases)
All ADR opt-in 
cases (N=946 
cases)
Non-opt in cases 
(N=1103 cases)
Total for all areas 81 (33%) 319 (46%) 400 (42%) 2 (0.2%)
Looking at the nature of the directions issued, in the isolated examples of non-opt-in cases 
where directions were issued, exclusively the direction was to request a medical examination 
report. There was more diversity in the nature of directions associated with opt-in cases as 
shown in Table 3.5. The most common direction issued in opt-in cases was also to request a 
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medical examination report (a direction in 44% of all opt-in cases). In addition, there was also 
a relatively high proportion (28%) of cases where the direction was to convert the hearing 
from paper to oral and ‘other’ directions (19%), which included, for example, to obtain a 
supplementary submission. 
Table 3.5:  Nature of directions issued in all opt-in cases at ENE stage
Medical 
examination/
GP Report
Convert from 
paper to oral 
hearing
Obtain further 
evidence Other
Total cases 
where 
directions 
issued
Total all areas 176 (44%) 112 (28%) 36 (9%) 76 (20%) 400 (100%)
Multiple directions were issued in 16% of all opt-in cases. Typically, this included one or 
more different types of direction. Examples could include an operational direction issued to 
Tribunals Service Operations to convert the hearing from paper to oral and a direction to the 
appellant to obtain further evidence or seek advice.
As noted above, interviews with Tribunals Service administrative clerks suggested that 
the issuing of directions at the ENE stage might have a negative effect on achieving the 
performance target for listing cases, as this target was based on the period from receipt of 
the pre-enquiry form to first hearing and not the period to resolution of case. Analysis on the 
average time between key milestones suggested that this might be true. For all opt-in cases, 
irrespective of whether directions were issued, the average time between the pre-enquiry 
form being received15 and the appeal listing date was 19 working days. For cases which 
had directions of any kind issued, this increased to an average of 29 working days and to 41 
working days for cases where the direction was to request a medical examination report. For 
non-opt-in cases overall the average time between receipt of the pre-enquiry form and listing 
was just six working days. Tribunals Service staff suggested that the issuing of directions 
might increase the period between starting the appeal and listing for a hearing. However, they 
believed that the overall clearance time of the case should not have been negatively affected, 
as the direction was typically just moved to an earlier point in the process. In non-opt-in cases, 
the direction may simply have been issued following an adjournment to the hearing. This was 
evidenced somewhat by the average clearance time for all opt-in cases being 46 working days 
and 54 working days where directions were issued, compared to the average for non-opt-in of 
42 working days. The speed of resolving cases is examined further below. 
15 The Tribunals Service pre-hearing enquiry form, the TAS1 form, must be returned by all appellants within 14 
days of receipt to proceed with their appeal.
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Looking at whether directions issued at an earlier point in a case’s progress prevent a later 
hearing adjournment, Table 3.6 details the outcomes associated with the cases where 
directions were issued. It can be seen that in 55 cases where directions were issued, the case 
was still adjourned at the hearing. This represents 64% of the total number of opt-in cases (85 
cases) which were adjourned at the first hearing, as shown in Table 3.3. Analysis of the nature 
of the directions issued in respect of the cases that were adjourned at the first hearing included 
a relatively high proportion of directions to convert the hearing from paper to oral. It was clear, 
therefore, that while directions were effective in serving to support better evidenced cases, in 
themselves they did not serve to prevent adjournments at the hearing. It was likely that other 
issues emerged during the hearing which contributed to the reasons for adjournment.
Table 3.6: Profile of outcomes from opt-in cases where directions issued and 
all non-opt in cases
Withdrawal Lapse Hearing
Adjournment at 
first hearing
Total opt-in cases 
where directions 
issued (n=400)
13 (3%) 72 (18%) 260 (65%) 55 (14%)
All non-opt in 
cases (n=1003)
47 (45%) 50 (5%) 1,006 (91%) 195 (18%)
It was interesting to note the proportion of all opt-in cases where directions were issued (21%) 
that were then subsequently withdrawn or lapsed. These cases did include a number where 
the direction was to request a medical examination report, which has a cost implication for 
the Tribunals Service. Specifically, there was a concern raised by DTJs and Tribunals Service 
staff that there were a small number of opt-in cases where a medical examination report 
was requested following the ENE but that it was a wasted cost because a parallel decision 
was made by either the PDCS to lapse the case or the appellant themselves to withdraw the 
case. It was not possible to do more robust analysis to identify the specific cost implications 
of this for the Tribunals Service so this was not included in the subsequent cost analysis. The 
spreadsheet did not provide information on the specific type of further information received 
so preventing specific examination of where medical examination reports had been received 
unnecessarily or where the order had been cancelled in time following a decision to withdraw 
or lapse the case. 
The provision of further information
The spreadsheet recorded further information being received for 45% (442 cases) of all opt-in 
cases but only 25% (278 cases) of non-opt-in cases. Logically, this difference could be accounted 
for by the significantly higher level of directions issued for opt-in cases, many of which were 
related to obtaining further information. This was also supported by the analysis which showed 
that 63% of the cases where further information was received had directions issued. In just under 
half of these cases, the direction was focused on obtaining additional evidence. However, there 
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was insufficient detail on the spreadsheet on the type of further evidence received to further 
explore its impact on a case’s progression through the appeal process.
Speed of resolution
The pilot spreadsheet recorded dates when key milestones concerning a case’s progress 
through the appeal were achieved. As such, it was possible to analyse the speed with which 
ADR opt-in and non-opt-in cases proceeded overall and the time implications of the additional 
tasks associated with the ADR process.
Calculations of the overall average time for cases to be resolved used the date the pre- 
enquiry form was received as the start of an appeal.16 Case resolution was defined by a date 
associated with the end of the appeal; i.e. either a withdrawal, lapse or hearing where there 
was an associated tribunal decision. Table 3.7 details the overall average time for opt-in and 
non-opt-in cases to be resolved.
Table 3.7:  Overall average time taken to resolve opt-in cases-working days
ADR cases (all) 
(N=946)
Stage one and 
two ADR process 
(Outcome 3-10) 
(N=249)
Stage one ADR 
process  
(Outcome 2) 
(N=697)
Non-ADR cases 
(N=1103)
Average for all 
areas
46 working days 34 working days 49 working days 42 working days
The average time for case resolution was 46 working days for opt-in cases, compared to 42 
working days for non-opt-in cases. This suggested that the ADR process slowed down the 
speed of case resolution when looking at ADR cases as a whole. Cases that were subject to 
both stages of the ADR process were resolved in an average of 34 working days. The removal 
of the hearing appeared to be the key achievement of the ADR process which impacted on 
speed of resolution. 
Time between key ADR activities
Analysis of the average time between cases being referred to DTJs for evaluation, whether the 
first or second referral, and the evaluation being undertaken was the same across each area. 
This suggested that any variation between different pilot areas in the overall time for opt-in 
cases to be resolved was not related to the ADR process. There was very little variation in the 
figure at the times when interview findings suggested there were issues with the capacity of 
DTJs to undertake ADR activities The analysis did not identify any significant findings related to 
the efficiency of DTJs in undertaking ENE or telephone calls in a timely manner at the time of 
the widening of the pilot geographies. 
16 To achieve consistency, the date the pre-enquiry form was received was used as the marker of the start of the 
appeal for all cases including those which began after the transfer of responsibility to the Tribunals Service for 
sending out the pre-enquiry form.
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Time to achieve outcomes
The average time to achieve outcomes was similar in respect of non-opt-in and opt-in cases as 
shown in Table 3.8. The exception was the time between the pre-enquiry form being received 
to mark the start of an appeal and the case resolution at first hearing. As reported above, the 
delay in listing opt-in cases until after ADR activities had been conducted was likely to account 
for this difference.
Table 3.8: Average time for achieving outcomes-working days
TAS1 received 
and the date 
withdrawn
TAS1 received 
and the date 
appeal lapsed
TAS1 received 
and case 
resolution at 
1st hearing
Case 
resolution at 
2nd hearing
Case 
resolution at 
3rd hearing
All opt-in 
(N=1103)
37 working days 27 working days 47 working days 77 working days 86 working days
Non-opt in 
(N=946)
37 working days 36 working days 36 working days 75 working days 83 working days
ADR influence on benefit decision outcomes
Overall decision outcomes
Analysis was undertaken to explore change in the benefit outcomes of the appeal at different 
stages of the appeal process to assess any potential impact of the ADR process. This was 
done by identifying ‘change’ between key points where outcomes were identified. For example, 
change between the original PDCS decision and the outcome DTJs estimated a tribunal panel 
would award after undertaking the ENE and between the original decision and the final case 
outcome. Each element of the DLA or AA benefit was allocated an ‘up’, ‘down’ or ‘same’ code 
to represent change in the level of benefit. 
The change in benefit decisions, between the original decision and suggested decision of the 
DTJ after ENE, was examined to assess any potential impact of the ADR process, as shown 
in Table 3.9. The number of AA cases that were subject to ENE was too small to conduct any 
robust analysis in this regard. 
Table 3.9: Change in DLA decisions between original PDCS decision and 
suggested decision at ENE review stage-all opt-in cases
Mobility Component Care Component
All Opt-in cases
Up 61 (30%) 85 (42%)
Same 138 (69%) 113 (56%)
Down 2 (1%) 4 (2%)
Total 201 (100%) 202 (100%)
Across both the mobility and care elements of the DLA benefit, the majority of cases 
represented no change between the original PDCS decision and the probable outcome 
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identified by the DTJ at the ENE stage. However, there was a proportion of cases where the 
benefit rate was expected to have gone up. This was slightly higher in respect of the care 
component (42%), compared to 30% of mobility component cases. 
The following tables detail the proportion of DLA cases where changes occurred between the 
original PDCS decision and the final case outcome to assess the potential impact of the ADR 
process. The number of AA cases in the sample was too small to do comparable analysis for 
this benefit.
Table 3.10:  Change in DLA decisions between original decision and final 
outcome - all areas
Mobility Component Care Component
Non-opt in cases All Opt-in cases Non-opt in cases All Opt-in cases
Up 340 (38%) 201 (30%) 427 (47%) 280 (40%)
Same 553 (61%) 456 (69%) 463 (51%) 402 (58%)
Down 9 (1%) 3 (1%) 13 (1%) 9 (1%)
Total 902 (100%) 660 (100%) 903 (100%) 691 (100%)
* Cases were excluded from the analysis where one or more parts of information needed for the calculation 
was missing. The base number of cases, therefore, does not always match the total overall sample sizes
The change in outcomes for DLA benefits between the original PDCS decision and the 
final outcome for opt-in cases broadly represented the same pattern of change as identified 
between the original decision and that of the DTJ at the ENE review. This suggested that 
DTJ views of the expected tribunal decision were largely correct. In respect of the mobility 
element, the majority of appellants (around two-thirds) were most likely to achieve the same 
level of benefit at the end of their appeal, compared to the original claim decision. Around 
a third achieved an increase in their benefit. For the care component, just under half of 
appellants achieved an increase in benefit with just over half staying the same. Only in 
isolated cases, across both benefit components, around 1% of cases, did appellants achieve 
a lower decision. 
There was a slight difference between non-opt-in cases and all opt-in cases in the overall 
change in decision. This suggested that the ADR process as a whole did not impact 
significantly on the outcomes achieved by appellants. For example, in respect of the mobility 
element, 30% of opt-in cases achieved an increase in their benefit compared to 38% of 
non-opt-in cases. Similarly, in respect of the care component, 40% of opt-in cases achieved 
an increase compared to 47% of non-opt-in cases. When looking at wider statistics on the 
success of appeals made in the SSCS Tribunal, however, it appeared that ADR appellants 
potentially achieved poorer outcomes. In 2007/08, statistics suggest that 44% of hearings 
were cleared in favour of appellants, effectively the decision went up, while 56% of appeals 
were upheld,17 essentially the decision stayed the same. While these figures were not 
17 Figures provided by the Tribunals Service in December 2008.
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directly comparable (as the national statistics deal with DLA appeals in general rather than 
differentiating between the two elements of DLA), these figures were higher than the 30% of 
appellants who achieved an increase in their mobility component and 40% who achieved an 
increase in their care component. 
It could be inferred that the probable outcomes identified by DTJs at the ENE stage had 
the potential to influence the final outcomes. However, it was not possible to draw robust 
conclusions in this respect. The outcome identified by the DTJ after the ENE was for 
illustrative purposes in conducting the ENE and was in no way able to influence the final 
decision an appellant might achieve if they proceeded to a hearing. The tribunal panel was 
not aware that cases were part of the ADR pilot and had no information on the outcome 
identified by DTJs at the ENE stage. The advice given to the potential losing party was 
also not compulsory, so the recommended actions did not have to be taken. This is further 
examined below by looking at the decision outcomes associated with individual route-ways.
Analysis of the characteristics of cases against the different outcomes did not reveal any 
significant findings that deviated from this overall pattern of outcomes achieved at the end 
of an appeal. Both cases that went to a paper or oral hearing were just as likely (in around 
a third of cases) to achieve a higher outcome, while the majority stayed the same. Only in 
isolated cases did the outcome go down. 
Outcome decisions by route-way
As reported above, the advice given by the DTJ to the losing party was a recommendation 
and it was optional whether the PDCS or appellant followed it. This section explores the 
outcomes in cases where the advice was not followed.
In terms of the seven measurable outcomes/route-ways associated with ADR, there 
were three outcomes which related to cases where DTJs telephoned the losing party but 
subsequently the advice was not followed and the case proceeded to a hearing. These 
were specifically outcomes three, six and seven. As shown in Table 3.11, in various cases 
appellants or the PDCS had ignored the advice of the DTJ and the case proceeded to a 
hearing, and appellants in some cases won their appeal or gained a higher settlement than 
the DTJ had thought would be agreed. This table is based on a relatively small number of 
cases so caution is needed in interpreting results.
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Table 3.11:  Outcome decisions where DTJ advice was not followed
Up Same Down Total
Outcome 3  
(PDCS did not follow 
advice)
DLA Mobility 
component
14 (58%) 12 (42%) 0 24 (100%)
DLA Care 
component
18 (69%) 7 (27%) 1 (4%) 26 (100%)
Outcome 6  
(Appellant did not follow 
advice and provided 
extra evidence)
DLA Mobility 
component
11 (25%) 33 (75%) 0 44 (100%)
DLA Care 
component
15 (35%) 28 (65%) 0 43 (100%)
Outcome 7 
(Appellant did not 
follow advice)
DLA Mobility 
component
14 (26%) 39 (74%) 0 53 (100%)
DLA Care 
component
17 (31%) 37 (68%) 0 54 (100%)
The analysis of outcomes six and seven appeared to show that DTJs were not always 
correct in their opinion that the appellant would be the losing party, with a quarter to a third 
of appellants achieving a higher outcome at the hearing. The DTJ call content was unknown, 
but it was likely to mean that the decision of the appeal tribunal was contrary to the opinion 
of the DTJ. It was possible that additional evidence received under outcome six or the oral 
evidence available at the hearing also increased the likelihood of a successful appeal for the 
appellant. It was also possible that additional information was supplied by appellants which 
affected the outcome, evidence which was not available to the DTJ at the time of the ENE.
In a smaller proportion of cases where the appellant was contacted by the DTJ, the 
appellants were strongly influenced by the opinion of the DTJ and withdrew their appeal. 
Whilst this amounts to only four per cent of the opt-in cases reviewed, it was not possible 
to say what proportion of these might have gone ahead and won their case if the DTJ had 
not made the call to the appellant as part of ADR, and stated that their opinion was that they 
would be the losing party. 
This section examined the quantitative outputs and outcomes from the ADR pilot using 
quantitative data produced from an analysis of the pilot spreadsheets. The following section 
provides the qualitative outcomes data.
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Pilot impact: qualitative outcomes from ADR
This section examines the qualitative outcomes from the ADR pilot. It provides evidence in 
response to the following key research questions.
 ● Were there any other impacts of ADR?
 ● What impact did ADR have on the PDCS?
 ● What do others (non-parties) think of ADR?
 ● Were appellants satisfied with the process?
Appellants’ satisfaction was examined throughout this section as it was typically closely 
related to the outcomes identified by appellants. Evidence is drawn for this chapter from the 
qualitative interviews. 
Key findings
 ● Tribunals Service staff, DTJs and the PDCS recognised that the ADR process had 
helped to establish a level of liaison and effective working relations between the 
different stakeholder organisations which would not otherwise have existed as contact 
between agencies outside of the ADR pilot was limited. ADR was contributing to a 
stronger sense of shared responsibility between PDCS and the Tribunals Service for 
the efficient and proportionate conclusion of appeals. 
 ● Professional development opportunities were another outcome identified by Tribunals 
Service staff which emerged from the ADR pilot. Administrative clerks’ involvement 
in the ADR process, in particular, had positive benefits for the development and job 
satisfaction of some of the administrative staff involved.
 ● Reducing the stress which appellants often reported to feel as a result of participating 
in the appeal process was an outcome identified by many appellants as a benefit 
of the ADR process. This was achieved by either avoiding the hearing or giving 
appellants greater confidence in their case by offering a discussion with an 
independent and knowledgeable person. 
 ● There was some level of dissatisfaction amongst appellants around access to justice 
offered by the ADR process, where they were advised to withdraw their appeal or 
when the case did not reach a hearing when they wanted it to. It was known, however, 
that satisfaction was lower with the judicial/tribunal process where the outcome was 
not favorable to the appellant (the ‘outcome effect’) and this was reflected here by 
dissatisfaction with the outcomes almost directly mirroring lost appeals, both amongst 
opt-in and non-opt-in appellants.
Building relationships between key parties
Tribunals Service staff, DTJs and the PDCS recognised that the ADR process had helped to 
establish a level of liaison and effective working relations between the different stakeholder 
organisations. This would not otherwise have existed, as contact between agencies outside 
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of the ADR pilot was limited. From this liaison, interviewees acknowledged there had been 
knowledge transfer and sharing between the Tribunals Service and PDCS, and to a lesser 
extent, external advice agencies, welfare rights groups and advocacy organisations. This 
had served to increase understanding on all sides of the processes, priorities and activities 
of the different stakeholders. Although some of this was specific to the ADR process, there 
had been a knock-on increase in understanding across agencies and identification of some 
specific learning in respect of the traditional appeal process. Staff interviews also suggested 
that decision-making processes and particularly the evidential requirements for appeals had 
been more widely shared and understood as a result of contact between PDCS and DTJs. 
The close liaison required to enable the pilot to take place was felt to be particularly helpful 
for the PDCS. As this representative suggested: 
“It’s the rapport I think that we’ve got between us. I’ve got a better understanding 
of what they’re looking at” 
(PDCS staff member)
This suggested not only that ADR was contributing to the quality assurance of original claim 
decisions but also a stronger sense of shared responsibility for the efficient and proportionate 
conclusion of appeals. 
The direct feedback from the DTJ during telephone calls to the PDCS or alternatively by 
PDCS staff themselves through the review of cases in preparation for this call was referred to 
as both a support and an incentive for general performance improvement. As this PDCS staff 
member summarised: 
“It’s made me realise, it’s made me concentrate on why we are doing appeals, 
why have we got these appeals, from the department’s point of view I think more 
than anything else” 
(PDCS staff member)
This was further linked to the pursuit of good customer service for PDCS through making 
robust decisions on original claims, as this PDCS staff member reported: 
“It costs to go to an appeal, so eventually if we can … reduce the appeals; get it 
right first time, its good customer service” 
(PDCS staff member)
Additionally, the feedback from the DTJs had been used to inform the coaching and training 
of staff members, as this PDCS representative suggested: 
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“It’s helped me because that is my role, is to improve performance as a whole, 
that’s how I see my role, so it’s been one useful little piece of a very big jigsaw. 
So it’s been useful because I can use it to coach people” 
(PDCS staff member)
Professional development opportunities and job satisfaction
Professional development opportunities were another outcome identified by Tribunals 
Service staff which emerged from the ADR pilot. Some of the administrative clerks involved in 
the ADR process felt that it had positive benefits for some of the administrative staff involved, 
allowing them to gain experience of Excel spreadsheets. The contact with DTJs and PDCS 
had allowed them to develop good relationships with this first tier agency that they would not 
otherwise had been involved with. As a result, administrative clerks in particular, reported 
greater job satisfaction as they were able to see the project and cases from beginning to end. 
Their positive contribution to the ADR process was also clear. 
Reducing stress for appellants
The interviews with appellants who opted into ADR revealed a number of less tangible or soft 
outcomes from the process. Reducing the stress which appellants often reported to feel as a 
result of participating in the appeal process was an outcome identified by many appellants as 
a benefit of the ADR process. This manifested itself in a number of ways. ADR encouraged 
appellants to weigh up the extent to which the stress of attendance at a hearing would affect 
them mentally, physically and financially against the loss of opportunity to present their case 
in person. Appellants typically identified that not having to attend a hearing where their case 
was already thought to be weak by a DTJ, was a key aspect of their decision to withdraw: 
“Where somebody’s got a hopeless case that would just take a lot of energy and 
emotion from their point of view to attend a hearing, so they’re saved the trauma 
of having to come to a hearing and then not succeeding” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
ADR was, however, also identified by opt-in appellants as reducing the stress associated with 
the appeal process in general, specifically by giving them greater confidence in their case 
regardless of whether they went to a paper or oral hearing. The ADR process achieved this 
by offering a discussion with an independent and knowledgeable person: 
“I think if somebody else looks at it first that’s not on their (PDCS) side and not on 
your side, you know, they are in between. They are looking at everything that you 
have given them, I think it gives you a different look on things I suppose” 
(Bristol opt-in appellant)
A further outcome of the ADR process, related specifically to the telephone call from the DTJ to the 
appellant, had been the value of the discussion with the DTJ for the appellant. Appellants reported 
reduced feelings of stress because ADR provided this opportunity to be reassured or to check 
practical details about the oral hearing which meant they were more prepared for the experience: 
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“Oh yes he was very helpful and he was talking through things with me which 
made me feel much better about going” 
(Bexleyheath opt-in appellant)
The DTJ calls had both supported appellants’ understanding of the appeal process and 
also helped them to make decisions regarding appearing at the hearing or opting for a 
paper hearing. One appellant said that, although they did not win the appeal, the DTJ 
had suggested that the appellant could attend the hearing in person, which they did. They 
thought that this helped them even though in the end, attending was, “a waste of time”. They 
commented that the call had helped them know more about the process and their options: 
“I thought that [the call] was alright, its better than not, not getting to know anything, 
when you’re getting to know something at least you know where you are standing” 
(Bexleyheath opt-in appellant)
Another soft outcome for appellants was, especially, but not exclusively, where they did not 
have a representative or advocate, simply being able to talk to someone about their case. 
This was an aspect of the ADR process that appellants related to their satisfaction. One 
appellant described how she had struggled to discuss her case with anyone, and the call 
from the DTJ was an opportunity to talk about things she had found difficult: 
“It’s hard to discuss things, I mean I don’t even speak to family members” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
A further group of appellants who received directions formally or informally from the DTJ during 
their call identified this as a very helpful aspect of the process. Appellants reported improving 
their cases with additional medical evidence, concentrating on the correct legal area as a result 
of the DTJ’s opinion, or increasing their success over a paper hearing by appearing in person. 
Even where the DTJ made the call to the appellants to suggest they may be the losing party, 
there were appellants who decided not to withdraw, and utilised the call to help discuss and 
build their case before they proceeded to a hearing. Where directions were given by the DTJ, 
satisfaction was higher than where the call led to a simple withdrawal. Appellants considered it 
gave them a better chance of a fair and speedy outcome. DTJs also pointed out the strongest 
aspects of the case to appellants, and clarified points of law, and encouraged appellants to 
attend the appeal hearing in person. For example, one appellant reported his call in this way: 
“He said, because I actually put down that I didn’t want to be there because in 
places I don’t know people and people I’m around, I’m very nervous, but he did say 
it would be best if I did attend if I could, but any information I could get would help” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
There were also higher levels of satisfaction where appellants had wanted to avoid a 
stressful hearing or the cost and time of travel to a hearing, or were more comfortable 
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with telephone calls from their own home than going to an external venue. ADR offered 
the opportunity to do this. This extended to appellants who had opted for a paper hearing, 
because, by speaking to the DTJ by telephone, the process was less impersonal than a 
paper hearing. High levels of satisfaction were achieved where the appeal process was dealt 
with quickly and efficiently (noted above), though in some cases the appellants would have 
preferred a slightly longer lead-in time to assemble evidence.
Communication following opt-in
A negative outcome identified for some appellants was a feeling of disempowerment where 
their case was not considered suitable for both stages of the ADR process or where a call 
was made to the PDCS, and as such no further contact was made with the appellant. This 
led to appellants thinking their opt-in had been ignored, or feeling disempowered because the 
case was resolved without their involvement. Appellants commonly reported being unaware if 
ADR had affected their case or not, or really understanding what had happened as a result: 
“From the time I filled that yellow form out I never heard another thing, so really I 
wouldn’t have known if they were doing anything or not. So as far as I know they 
didn’t do anything” 
(Bristol opt-in appellant)
Appellants commonly stated, when asked how the ADR process might be improved, that they 
would have liked more support through the whole process, but especially in being talked through 
what ADR stage they were at and what would happen next. For example, one appellant said that: 
“I think just if you could speak to somebody on the phone and they could explain 
things in detail with you about what’s going to happen and how it’s going to 
happen, that would be a lot easier” 
(Bristol opt-in appellant)
Appellants and their representatives widely suggested that the communication process 
needed to be improved so that they were in touch with what was happening during the 
ADR process, and so that they could track progress on their case. Where this experience 
led to appellants feeling disempowered, this posed a risk that appellants would not opt for 
any future opportunity to use ADR again. Written communication would be the most logical 
approach but alternatives such as telephone contact could be explored. This would also 
serve to achieve the additional benefits demonstrated through the DTJ calls to appellants of 
better evidence at hearings or increased appellant attendance at oral hearings.
Proportionate resolution of cases
A very important research question was the extent to which ADR increased the potential for 
an enhanced judicial function through more proportionate18 resolution of cases. The principal 
18 Proportionate resolution in the context of the ADR pilot is defined as resolving disputes earlier and more 
effectively through strongly evidenced cases and opportunities to settle appeals outside of a tribunal.
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impression of the impact of ADR had been to minimise the need for hearings and reduce the 
number of adjournments. There had also been clear cost benefits associated with this as outlined 
in the next chapter. There were also a range of other soft benefits arising from the reduction of 
hearings and adjournments for appellants, including reduction in levels of stress and speedier 
resolution of cases. However, it was important to consider the extent to which these factors 
interact with potentially improved or reduced levels of access to justice and fair outcomes for 
appellants. The researchers examine this from the points of view of the various parties below. 
A key ‘added value’ element of ADR had been the greater than anticipated impact of the ENE 
review, plus subsequent directions. This meant that even where a case did not go through 
both stages of the ADR process, a significant proportion of cases were receiving further 
and clearer evidence more quickly as a result of the issuing of directions. This approach 
pre-empted the change in rules that the first-tier Tribunals operated under following the 
operational reforms of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. This came into force 
in November 2008 and allowed for greater use of directions and wider case management 
powers for DTJs and Tribunal Judges more widely. 
In addition, adjustments to the scope and purpose of the DTJ telephone calls to progress 
cases through the issuing of directions and often recommending appellants identified as the 
potential losing party attend an oral hearing, appeared to have clearly led to improvements to 
the quality of evidence made available to tribunal panels with subsequent benefits in terms 
of costs, time, reduced stress and speedier resolution of cases. In short, the ‘added value’ of 
the pilot exercise had been to strengthen and more finely tune a proactive case management 
approach to this appeal work. 
DTJs clearly recognised proportionate justice to be a key outcome from ADR. A strong evidence 
base available to a tribunal panel, achieved through ADR, was recognised by DTJs as a key to 
ensuring that the judicial decision was right, effective and fair. As this DTJ summarised: 
“Cases would have been heard anyway but we provided better evidence through 
our directions which means there is hopefully a better chance of fairer outcomes” 
(District Tribunal Judge)
The achievement of proportionate resolution of cases in terms of minimising unnecessary 
time lost, presenting a full and properly evidenced case and achieving resolution of appeals 
in a timely manner, was identified by the Tribunals Service as an outcome from ADR. As 
described by this Tribunals Service staff member: 
“We will have progressed a case by identifying and giving directions to fill the 
gaps in the evidence, now as a result of our intervention they won’t have to 
adjourn and the cases will be disposed of more quickly” 
(Tribunals Service staff member)
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Researchers also asked appellants (both opt-in and non-opt-in) if the ADR process was 
perceived to increase or decrease the appellants’ chances of getting a fair appeal. Many 
thought that it would increase their chances of getting a fair outcome. For example, one 
appellant described how difficult the forms and the appeal system was, but that speaking with 
a judge who fully understood the system was helpful and increased their ability to understand 
the process and their options: 
“I think it [ADR] would increase it [chance of a fair hearing], because you would be 
working with the people who actually work with the documentation in the first place” 
(Bexleyheath opt-in appellant)
Another appellant’s view was that ADR was, 
“almost like having a secretary for yourself really, it’s like having a secretary 
saying to me you could really put a bit more effort into this, you could write more 
things about your case” 
(Bristol non opt-in appellant)
However, there was dissatisfaction amongst some appellants around access to justice 
offered by the ADR process in relation to their own case, as opposed to more general 
questions regarding ADR in principle. Dissatisfaction occurred generally where the appellants 
did not achieve the appeal settlement they had hoped for, and also where the appellant did 
not attend a hearing. Some of these appellants felt they did themselves an injustice by not 
representing themselves in person at a hearing. 
“I just think I did myself an injustice, I think the case would have been looked into 
more thoroughly had I gone in person, I really do, I think I should have” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
However, there were also some appellants who took a principled stand against ADR, with 
one appellant stating that they would not use ADR because, 
“I would not be there to defend myself” 
(Sutton non-opt-in appellant)
These appellants clearly felt that their access to the judicial system was best served by 
attending an oral hearing. 
It was also clear that, having received the DTJ call, a small number of appellants who 
withdrew also felt that they had not had a fair hearing or proportionate access to justice. 
Appellants often took a resigned approach to withdrawing the appeal following the DTJ’s 
advice, but reported feeling worn down and despondent rather than feeling they had been 
subject to a fair system: 
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“Just accept what you’re given and that’s it, you know. If I was to appeal again it 
would be procedures, letters again, more paperwork, doctor’s reports” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
Fear drove some appellants’ decisions to withdraw the appeal following the DTJ’s call. One 
appellant reported feeling “confused and scared” of losing her DLA altogether following the 
DTJ’s call and so withdrew her appeal (Sutton opt-in appellant). It was also known from the 
research literature on social security and other tribunal appeals that satisfaction was lower 
with the judicial/tribunal process where the outcome was not favourable to the appellant: 
this is sometimes referred to as the ‘outcome effect’ (Sainsbury et al., 1995). This was 
reflected in the qualitative interviews with appellants, with dissatisfaction with the outcomes 
almost directly mirroring lost appeals, both amongst opt-in and non-opt-in appellants. This 
was certainly a factor in the levels of dissatisfaction expressed when the DTJs have stated 
that in their opinion the case may not succeed. However, it was important that the call to 
the appellants did not diminish their access to a fair hearing, or be perceived to do so by 
appellants, because this would bring ADR into disrepute. There was some evidence from 
staff interviews that adjustments made in the later stages of the pilot had already begun to 
address this issue. Specifically, DTJs tended to make calls that primarily concentrated on 
giving directions and encouraging attendance at a hearing in person.
Recommending ADR to others
Appellants were also asked if they would recommend others to use ADR in future. This 
yielded examples of positive comments, which was a further outcome from ADR, though 
there were other examples of appellants who clearly spoke against it (see above). One 
appellant stated they would always encourage people to take up the help offered (in this 
case, ADR): 
“I would encourage anybody to use help within the system, because they’ve got 
to know the system more than you…they didn’t help us any further than that 
[case lost] but yes I would advise anybody to take it up” 
(Bexleyheath opt-in representative)
Another appellant stated that it should always be clear that ADR was not an alternative to 
attending a hearing before they would consider recommending the process to others.
Yet others said that everyone should make up their own mind about the value of ADR: 
“weigh it up and its up to you….its your personal choice, everyone is an 
individual” 
(Sutton opt-in appellant)
Having examined the qualitative and quantitative outcomes from the ADR pilot, the following 
section draws this evidence together to assess overall cost effectiveness.
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Pilot impact: cost-effectiveness 
This section examines the cost effectiveness of the ADR pilot, reporting on the additional 
costs and savings generated from the ADR process. It provides evidence in response to the 
following key research question:
 ● is ADR cost-effective?
As noted earlier, the findings in this report were based on the assumption that opt-out and opt-in 
cases had similar characteristics. There remained a risk that this was not the case, and therefore 
findings related to the differences between the two groups should be treated with caution.
Key findings
 ● In total, the estimated cost to the Tribunals Service of delivering the ADR process during 
the pilot period to 946 cases was £210,076 compared to £222,867 for dealing with 
1,006 non-opt-in cases across the same period. This equates to unit costs of £222 for 
opt-in cases compared to £202 for non-opt-in cases. Overall, the opt-in ADR process as 
a whole was less cost-effective during the pilot period than non-opt-in cases. 
 ● Although opt-in cases incurred higher costs to deliver the process, it generated higher 
savings, particularly in respect of avoiding first hearings and subsequent hearings as 
a result of an adjournment. This was clearly seen for cases which were subject to both 
stages of the ADR process. After the reduction in costs from avoided hearings the unit 
cost for those going through both stages was calculated as £188 per case. 
 ● Should the ADR process be used more widely in the future, reduced administrative 
costs would be incurred. Removing these costs, it would cost £219 to deliver opt-in 
cases and £202 for non-opt-in cases in the post-pilot period. Other savings in respect 
of the additional costs associated with delivering ADR could potentially also be saved 
as a result of the process being delivered in a changed operating context following 
the reforms introduced under the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Further 
analysis is required to explore whether this assumption is valid.
Comparative time and costs for ADR
One of the key objectives for the evaluation was to assess whether ADR was cost-effective. 
The approach to answering this question involved the examination of financial costs only 
through the development of average unit costs for different elements of the process or key 
staff involved in the pilot. Specifically unit costs were developed for the following:
 ● DTJ time inputs for the ENE review, making telephone calls to the likely losing party and 
issuing directions;
 ● administrative clerks’ time on tasks associated with ADR and for non-ADR cases;
 ● hearings, including the costs associated with attendance by the DTJ, Disability Member, 
Medical Member, expenses incurred by all parties and venue costs.
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DTJs’ and administrative staff’s unit costs were calculated using time information provided 
by staff themselves, representing the real rather than estimated time inputs for the process 
as it operated during the pilot. DTJs recorded the time they spent on each case, including 
conducting the ENE, contacting the potential losing party and issuing directions on the 
summary form for each case reviewed. This was then transferred onto the pilot spreadsheet 
which allowed an average time to be generated. The unit cost was then calculated using 
salary costs supplied by the Tribunals Service finance team. 
Likewise, administrative staff time inputs were collected through a timesheet system. Each 
opt-in and non-opt-in case file had a time sheet attached which was marked with a unit of 
time on each occasion administrative clerks undertook administrative work associated with 
that case. Salary costs for administrative clerks where then used to calculate unit costs 
for their input into the ADR process. Unit costs for the hearing were based on fixed costs 
supplied by the finance team of the Tribunals Service. 
The following sections provide analysis of the cost-effectiveness of the ADR process as it 
operated during the pilot period using these unit costs. Later sections examine the potential 
costs of the process in the future, taking account of a different operating context as a result of 
the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. 
Costs for providing ADR
Using the unit costs for different staff and elements of the process, calculations were made in 
terms of the costs associated with providing specific ADR activities as summarised in Table 3.12. 
Table 3.12: Costs for ADR task
ADR Activity Unit Cost
ADR stage one - DTJ conducting ENE and 
issuing directions- on average 33 minutes*
£54.45
ADR Stage two - DTJ contacting the losing party- 
on average 12 minutes**
£19.80
Total DTJ time for ADR tasks per case - on 
average 45 minutes
£74.25
Total administrative time for ADR tasks*** - on 
average 29 minutes 
£5.80
* Calculated using time information provided for 1046 ENE reviews and an hourly rate of £99.
** Calculated on time information for 249 cases with a telephone call and an hourly rate of £99.
*** Calculated using administrative time sheet information for 253 opt-in cases and an hourly rate of £12. 
Average time per opt-in case was 29 minutes, which was six minutes more (£1.20) than non-opt-in cases 
which took 23 minutes on average.
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This suggested that the additional total cost per case during the pilot for all ADR related tasks 
conducted by DTJs and administrative staff was £75.45.19 Finance information supplied by 
the Tribunals Service suggests that the average financial cost of a hearing was £182.90. This 
breaks down as follows:
Table 3.13: Hearing costs
Costs Per session Per case*
Legally qualified panel member fee and expenses £214.69 £75.86
Medical member fee and expenses £163.98 £57.94
Disability member fee and expenses £102.08 £36.07
Appellant expenses £8.90 £3.14
Venue costs £28 £9.89
Total £517.65 £182.90
* Cost per case was calculated using an average of 2.83 cases completed per session, the average supplied 
by the Tribunals Service.
It should be noted that these costs focused on the financial costs of a hearing; they did not 
take into account other potential costs concerning appellants’ time or psychological costs for 
attending a hearing. This analysis was beyond the scope of this evaluation. There was also an 
assumption that all hearing costs were the same regardless of the characteristics of the case.
Additional/cost savings associated with the ADR pilot 
Additional costs associated with the ADR pilot
Conducting ENE and telephoning the potential losing party were additional tasks undertaken 
as part of the ADR process during the pilot period, therefore potentially adding a cost of 
£74.25 to each appeal case that opted into ADR. However, earlier analysis revealed that not 
all cases were subject to both stages of the ADR process. Table 3.14 provides a breakdown 
of the additional costs for the different types of opt-in cases and used the total number of 
cases in each category to calculate the overall additional costs of the ADR pilot.
Cost savings associated with the ADR pilot
It can be estimated that £182.90 net was saved per case where the ADR process assisted in 
a case not proceeding to a hearing. Using the data on the total number of opt-in cases which 
were lapsed or withdrawn and as such a hearing was avoided, it is possible to calculate the 
cost savings made by ADR during the pilot period, as shown in Table 3.15.
The total saving of £54,687 for opt-in cases where a hearing was avoided compared 
favourably to the costs saved for non-opt-in cases. There were 97 non-opt-in cases which 
were withdrawn or lapsed, thus saving only £17,741.
19 See Table 7.3 for a further explanation of the breakdown of the costs.
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Table 3.14:  Additional costs associated with ADR per case and pilot overall
 Additional costs incurred
Cost per 
case 
No. of 
cases 
overall
Total 
additional 
cost for the 
pilot
Stage one 
and two ADR 
process cases 
DTJ time to conduct ENE, issue directions 
and telephone losing party- £74.25
£75.45 249 £18,787
Additional administrative time for opt-in 
cases £1.20*
Stage one 
ADR cases
DTJ time to conduct ENE and issue 
directions- £54.45 £55.65 697 £38,788
Administrative time for opt-in cases £1.20
No ADR 
process cases
Effectively non-opt-in case: administrative 
time for non-opt-in case - £4.60
£4.60 32 £147
Total additional 
pilot costs
£57,722
* Average time per opt-in case was 29 minutes and for non-opt-in cases was 23 minutes. There was six 
minutes more (£1.20) of administrative time associated with opt-in cases on average.
Table 3.15:  Cost savings achieved by the ADR pilot
Costs saved per case
No. of 
cases 
overall
Total 
savings for 
the pilot
Cases which were withdrawn First hearing costs - £182.90 39 £7,133
Cases which were lapsed First hearing costs - £182.90 182 £33,288
Cases which avoided an adjournment Second hearing costs - £182.90 78 £14,266
Total saved costs £54,687
PDCS time inputs and costs
PDCS provided data on the time inputs of different staff members involved in the ADR 
process. From this, it was possible to identify the additional and saved costs from PDCS’s 
participation in the ADR pilot. Table 3.16 summarises this for each outcome. It should be 
noted that at the start of the pilot process, PDCS staff reviewed all cases that a DTJ was due 
to consider on a given ADR day. However, given the relatively small number of cases where 
the DTJ contacted the PDCS as the losing party, this process changed after the initial months 
of the pilot so that PDCS only previewed cases they knew the DTJ wanted to discuss. The 
previewing costs presented below refer to the latter process of reviewing only those cases 
where the PDCS were to be contacted.
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Table 3.16:  PDCS cost per outcome
PDCS activity
PDCS costs per case associated 
with route way 
Total 
additional 
costs 
Cost savings 
per case
1b Case not suitable due to lack 
of resources/time: No action 
by PDCS, business as usual
None None None
2 ENE carried out but not 
suitable for subsequent ADR 
None None None
3 ENE carried out, appellant 
likely to win. PDCS previews 
case in preparation of call from 
DTJ and takes call from DTJ. 
PDCS reconsiders case but 
decision NOT revised or NOT 
revised in appellants favour
30 mins spent by Decision- Maker 
Manager previewing case = £5.80
£11.27 
£349 in 
total (31 
cases)
None
20 mins on call to DTJ and 
discussing case with Decision-Maker 
= £3.87
10 mins spent by Decision- Maker 
discussing case with Decision- 
Maker Manager = £1.60
4 ENE carried out, appellant 
likely to win. PDCS previews 
case in preparation of call 
DTJ telephones PDCS, 
PDCS reconsiders, decision 
revised in appellants favour, 
appeal lapses
30 mins spent by Decision- Maker 
Manager previewing case = £5.80
£13.67 
£2611 in 
total (191 
cases)
Presenting 
Officer not 
attending 
hearing = 
£67.24 
PO attends 
7% of hearings 
= Saving of 
£874 (13 
cases)
20 mins on call to DTJ and 
discussing case with Decision-Maker 
= £3.87
10 mins spent by Decision- Maker 
discussing case with Decision-Maker 
Manager = £1.60
15 min spent by Decision- Maker 
reconsidering the case and lapsing 
the case = £2.40
5 ENE carried out, appellant 
likely to lose. DTJ telephones 
appellant and suggests 
action. Appellant withdraws 
appeal. No action by PDCS, 
business as usual
None None Presenting 
Officer not 
attending 
hearing= 
£67.24 
PO attends 
7% of hearings 
= Saving of 
£135 (2 cases)
6 ENE carried out, appellant 
likely to lose. DTJ telephones 
appellant and suggests 
action. Appellant provides 
extra evidence or seeks 
advice
30 mins by Decision-Maker 
reconsidering additional evidence  
= £4.80 
£4.80 
£264 in 
total (55 
cases)
None
7 ENE carried out, appellant 
likely to lose. DTJ telephones 
appellant and suggests 
action. Appellant does 
nothing
None None None
Totals £3,224 £2,215
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It can be calculated that the additional cost of the ADR pilot to the PDCS had been £3,224. 
This equated to an average cost of £3.41 per opt-in case. The only element of cost savings 
identified for the PDCS was the saving associated with the Presenting Officer attending the 
hearing. However, data provided by PDCS showed that a Presenting Officer only attended 
seven per cent of complex appeals. Using the figures on the number of opt-in cases where a 
hearing had been avoided (221), it could be calculated that Presenting Officers attended 15 
fewer hearings during the ADR pilot, thus saving £1,009. 
Hidden additional costs 
The evaluation identified a number of potential additional costs associated with ADR. Typically 
these costs were identified through interviews with DTJs or Tribunals Service staff or indicated 
in the quantitative analysis. Generally, there was insufficient information on the extent and 
actual costs involved to include them specifically in the cost-effectiveness analysis.
For example, costs would arise where the removal of the need for a hearing was undermined 
by the cost savings made where the case hearing would address payment of an over 
generous level of benefit, as in this example:
“There has been one case where by phoning somebody up and saying your 
appeal is not going to succeed, and they then saying, well I will withdraw, has 
actually left in place a decision which I considered was over generous. If the 
person withdrew their appeal the person would still be left with an award of 
benefit which in my view no tribunal would ever have given. But it’s very rare that 
that happens” 
(District Tribunal Judge)
As mentioned above, there were instances where a DTJ issued a direction following ENE 
to obtain a medical examination report, and subsequently the PDCS or appellant made a 
decision to withdraw or lapse the case. This had potential cost implications given that the 
cost to the Tribunals Service was £117.60 on average for each report. Further examination 
is needed to identify the communication mechanisms between agencies involved in these 
actions to explore whether any costs could be saved by early notification of withdrawal or 
lapse to allow the order for medical examination reports to be cancelled. More widely, the 
costs associated with medical evidence were not included in the cost analysis presented 
here. Under the changed operating context introduced as a result of the Tribunals and 
Court Enforcement Act, DTJs and TJs have greater case management powers and more 
previewing of cases occurs. There were likely to continue to be instances of requests for 
medical evidence before the hearing as happens through ENE. This pre-hearing cost could 
not, therefore, be related to ENE alone so it was not included in the cost analysis.
One of the common directions issued following ENE was to convert the hearing from a paper to 
an oral hearing. This had benefits for enhancing the quality of the evidence presented and an 
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appellant’s chance of achieving a positive outcome. There is a need to note, however, the potential 
additional costs of the increased number of oral hearings, which potentially could undermine 
the savings being made by ADR by removing the need for a hearing in other cases. Using the 
number of cases where a direction was issued to convert the hearing from paper to oral, it can be 
calculated that 112 additional oral hearings took place, equating to additional costs of £20,485.
ADR was also perceived by one DTJ to impact on the Tribunals Service budget through 
having to backfill the time when DTJs were involved in ADR activities. Given that DTJs are 
salaried positions there was an expectation that they would sit on a given number of hearings 
per week and do a certain amount of interlocutory work. Therefore, there was a recognised 
need for part-time Tribunal Judges to be brought in to pick up this work that was not 
completed as DTJs were undertaking ADR. However, this was perceived to be an issue for 
only one of the pilot areas and as such it might be a cost for some regions if the process was 
rolled out. Given the absence of robust data on backfilling costs and the potential regional 
variation, this was not included in the cost assessment of the pilot.
Cost-effectiveness of the ADR pilot
Using the unit costs calculated for different elements of the ADR process and the aspects 
that could be avoided as an outcome of the ADR process, it was possible to calculate overall 
costs associated with the different types of cases. When this was multiplied by the number of 
cases, it provided some information on the overall cost-effectiveness of the operation of the 
ADR process during the pilot process, as shown in Table 3.17. The table also includes the 
costs for dealing with the cases had the pilot not been in place, effectively if all cases were 
dealt with as non-opt-ins and were subject to the traditional appeals process.
In total, the estimated cost to the Tribunals Service of dealing with opt-in cases was £210,076 
between September 2007 and January 2009 when the pilot came to an end. This compared 
to £222,867 for dealing with non-opt-in cases across the same period. This was more robustly 
examined, however, using unit costs given the different number of opt-in and non-opt-in cases 
and the different costs incurred. Opt-in cases incurred higher costs to deliver the process 
than for non-opt-in cases but it generated lower costs as a result of avoiding hearings and 
adjournments. Taking these savings, together with the overall costs to deliver the process for 
different types of cases, it was possible to calculate unit costs of £222 per opt-in case and £202 
per non-opt-in case. Overall, therefore, the ADR process was less cost-effective than non-opt-
in cases. Looking specifically at the different types of opt-in cases, however, it was calculated 
that cases that were subject to only stage one of the ADR process cost on average £234 per 
case while those which went through both stages of the ADR process cost on average £188 
per case. However, please note that there was no way to identify opt-in cases suitable for stage 
one and two of the ADR process, without going through stage one of the ADR process.
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Post-pilot and future costs
The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 which came into force in November 2008, 
introduced a number of operational reforms which had the potential to reduce some of the 
additional costs incurred in delivering the ADR process during the pilot period. Specifically, 
changes introduced under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act had increased the time 
DTJs spend reviewing cases. As such, the £54.45 cost for the time DTJs spent conducting 
the ENE, potentially, would not be incurred as an additional cost through the ADR process in 
the future operation of the process. However, this change in operating context occurred too 
late in the evaluation of the pilot to allow collection of data to ascertain whether this was a 
robust assumption. Further analysis will be needed to ascertain the true impact of the TCE 
Act on DTJ time to provide evidence as to whether this assumption is true. Similarly, this 
additional time for case review would apply to non-opt-in cases so further analysis will also 
be required to explore the impact of this preparation time on the issuing of directions for non-
opt-in cases and the relative cost of hearings. For the purpose of calculating future costs at 
this stage, this additional cost for conducting ENE was still included and no adjustments were 
made to the costs relating to non-opt-in cases.
The fact that the process was being piloted introduced administrative costs which would not 
be incurred should the process be used more widely. Administrative staff who supported the 
ADR process also undertook a number of tasks during the pilot period, which were principally 
related to the pilot evaluation exercise. Specifically, administrative staff collated weekly 
statistics for the pilot steering group and entered case details onto a spreadsheet, two tasks 
which would not be undertaken if the ADR process was used more widely. Consultations with 
ADR administrative clerks revealed a consensus that these two tasks took around half of the 
total average time they spent supporting the ADR process. Thus the administrative time for 
supporting the ADR process would be reduced by £2.90 in a post-pilot operating context.
The following sections explore the costs of the ADR process outside of the pilot period and 
uses them to calculate the potential future costs of the ADR process. 
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Table 3.18: Potential costs incurred by the ADR process post pilot 
Stage one 
and two ADR 
process (n=249)
Stage one ADR 
cases (n=697)
All opt-in cases 
(n=946)
Non-opt-in 
cases (n=1103)
Providing ADR 
activities
249 cases @ 
£77.15*  
= £19,210
697 cases @ 
£57.35**  
= £39,973
Costs for stage 
one and stage 
one and two ADR 
cases = £59,183
Administrative 
costs: 1,103 
cases@ £2.90 = 
£3,199
First hearing costs 
(excluding cases 
which lapsed/were 
withdrawn) 
125 cases 
@ £182.90 = 
£22,863
600 cases 
@ £182.90 = 
£109,740
Costs for all 
opt-in cases = 
£132,603
1,006 cases 
@ £182.90 = 
£183,997
Second hearing costs 
after adjournment
22 cases @ 
£182.90 = £4,024
63 cases @ 
£182.90 = 
£11,523
85 cases @ 
£182.90 = 
£15,547
195 cases 
@ £182.90 = 
£35,666
Total costs incurred £46,097 £161,236 £207,333 £222,862
Unit cost per case £185 per case £231 per case £219 per case £202 per case
* Includes DJT time to conduct both stages of the ADR process-ENE review (£54.45) and telephone call 
(£19.80) and administrative time (£2.90).
** Includes DJT time to conduct the ENE review (£54.45) and administrative time (£2.90).
Using these unit costs in Table 3.18 it was possible to present some findings in terms of the 
potential future costs of the ADR process should it be rolled out more widely. Appendix D 
provides the full calculations used to generate the findings. It should be noted that the following 
findings were based on an assumption that the opt-in rate and profile of outputs for opt-in 
cases, as found in the pilot, would be replicated in any roll out. However, this is not guaranteed. 
It is possible that operation of the process in other geographical locations and by different 
staff may generate alternative outputs. The tendency seen in the pilot for DTJs to place an 
increasing emphasis through the ENE reviews on strengthening the case evidence and using 
the telephone call for this wider purpose, if continued would also probably generate a different 
profile of outputs and thus costs. The costs also did not include the potential hidden costs 
associated with the ADR process, in particular the costs of backfilling DTJ time when they 
were undertaking ADR activities, which would obviously increase if the process was used more 
widely. The following findings are, therefore, for illustration purposes only.
Figures provided by the Tribunals Service suggested that 73,480 DLA appeal cases had been 
dealt with in the 12-month period between April 2008 and the end of March 2009. Assuming 
that the opt-in rate to the ADR process found in the pilot exercise (78%) would be similar in any 
roll out, this equated to 57,314 cases which would be subject to the ADR process. Using the 
unit costs in Table 3.17, it can be calculated that the total cost for these opt-in cases would be 
£12.4 million (£12,397,955). This assumed that 25% (14,329 cases) would be subject to the 
stage one and two of the ADR process costing £2,650,865. In addition, 71% (40,692 cases) 
would be stage one ADR cases costing £9,399,852 and 3% (1,719 cases) would be no-ADR 
process cases costing (£347,238). The remaining 22% (16,166 cases) that did not opt-in 
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would cost £3,265,532. In total, therefore, the cost to resolve appeals for these cases would be 
£15,660,000. This represented a higher cost than would be incurred if all cases were treated 
as non-opt-in cases, which would cost £14,840,000. This was principally due to the additional 
costs incurred in delivering the ADR process. 
As above, further analysis is required to explore the assumption that the current operating 
context as a result of the TCE Act 2007, would reduce the additional costs incurred by 
removing the ENE review as an additional cost. If this was found to be valid, the overall costs 
incurred in delivering the ADR process would be significantly reduced. Combined with the 
costs saved through avoidance of first hearings where cases were lapsed or withdrawn and the 
avoidance of second hearings where hearings were adjourned, this would probably lead to an 
overall cost saving where ADR was used when compared to use of the traditional process only. 
If these assumptions were true, the removal of the £54.45 per case for conducting ENE, would 
lead to an estimated saving for the calculated 55,021 cases in Appendix four of a potential 
saving of up to £2 million pounds, compared to the current process.
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4.  Conclusions and recommendations
The following sections consider the findings of the evaluation in respect of the key research 
questions. As noted earlier, the findings in this report were based on the assumption that 
opt-out and opt-in cases had similar characteristics. There remained a risk that this was not 
the case, and therefore findings related to the differences between the two groups should be 
treated with caution.
Does ADR result in swifter, more proportionate resolution of cases?
There was some evidence to suggest that ADR resulted in more proportionate resolution of 
cases in terms of facilitating a fair and appropriate appeal system taking into account the 
interests of the different parties and the complexity of issues involved. However, the findings 
were less positive in respect of achieving swifter resolution of cases.
Some 23% of all opt-in cases were resolved without the need for a tribunal hearing. Although 
77% of opt-in cases still proceeded to a full hearing in spite of opting into ADR, there was 
a nine percentage point lower rate of adjournment for cases subject to ENE compared to 
non-opt-in cases. If this were extrapolated to the current workload of the Tribunals Service, 
this would equate to 13,182 extra cases which would avoid a hearing and 5,158 extra cases 
which would avoid an adjournment at first hearing when compared to non-ADR cases.20
Achievement of proportionate resolution of cases in terms of presenting a full and properly 
evidenced case was identified as a key outcome from ADR which supported the prevention 
of adjournments. In particular, a key ‘added value’ element of ADR had been the greater 
than anticipated impact of stage one of the ADR process - the ENE review, plus subsequent 
directions - which assisted in facilitating a more proactive case management approach. 
It meant that even when a case did not go through both stages of the ADR process, a 
significant proportion of cases received further and clearer evidence more quickly as a result 
of the issuing of directions. 
There was mixed evidence from appellants directly about whether ADR had achieved more 
proportionate resolution of cases. Even in cases where appellants did not achieve the 
outcome they wanted, there was acceptance by a number of appellants that their case had 
been dealt with fairly. The DTJ acting as an independent reviewer of the case at the ENE 
stage was commonly seen as a way of getting a fair and unbiased appeal. For appellants 
who then spoke to a DTJ, it was perceived to be helpful to have someone to talk the case 
through with, who provided what appellants typically perceived as useful advice to strengthen 
their case to help achieve a fair outcome. There was, however, some evidence of appellants 
who withdrew their case felt that they had not had a fair hearing or proportionate access to 
20 Based on base of 73,480 cases dealt with by the Tribunals Service between April 2008 and March 2009 
(figure supplied by the Tribunals Service in April 2009) and the 78% opt-in rate which was found in the pilot 
exercise.
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justice. They felt resigned to withdrawing the appeal following the DTJ’s advice rather than 
feeling they had been subject to a fair system. Similarly, the examples of cases where the 
potential losing party, either appellants or the PDCS, had ignored the advice of the DTJ and 
had subsequently won their appeal or gained a higher settlement, further undermined the 
achievements of ADR in respect of proportionate resolution of cases.
The findings suggested that the ADR process as a whole did not achieve swifter resolution 
of cases. Cases that were subject to the ADR process were, overall, resolved more slowly 
than non-opt-in cases, in an average of 46 working days for all opt-in cases compared to 
42 days for non-opt-in cases. The delay in listing opt-in cases until after the ENE had been 
conducted was likely to account for this being a higher average than that for non-opt-in 
cases. The removal of the hearing appeared to be the key achievement of the ADR process 
which impacted on speed of resolution. Those opt-in cases subject to both stages of the 
ADR process, which in turn generated the highest level of withdrawn and lapsed cases, were 
resolved in an average of 34 working days. Therefore, faster resolution for all ADR would 
require a higher proportion of all ADR cases not going to a hearing and/or changes to the 
listing process for hearings to make it faster.
Overall, therefore, there was evidence to conclude that ADR had achieved more 
proportionate resolution of cases to an extent but that it had impacted negatively on the 
speed of resolution of cases across the pilot as a whole. Essentially there was a potential 
conflict between the two elements of this objective. The benefits generated from stage one 
ADR cases, in relation to stronger evidenced cases but which still proceeded to a hearing, 
potentially undermined the achievements of the stage one and two ADR process cases in 
respect of cost savings and speed, where the need for a hearing was typically avoided. 
Is ADR cost-effective? 
Overall, the evaluation findings found that the ADR process was less cost-effective than 
the traditional process when looking at opt-in cases as a whole. In total, the estimated cost 
to the Tribunals Service of delivering the ADR process to 946 cases during the pilot period 
was £210,076 between September 2007 and January 2009 when the pilot came to an end, 
compared to £222,867 for dealing with 1,103 non-opt-in cases across the same period. 
This equated to an average of £222 per case for all ADR and £202 for non-opt-in cases. 
This calculation was based on unit costs of £80.05 to deal with cases that were subject to 
both stages of the ADR process cases, £60.25 for stage one ADR process cases and an 
additional £182.90 cost per hearing. 
Although opt-in cases as a whole incurred higher costs to deliver the process than for non-
opt-in cases there was evidence that it generated lower hearing costs overall as a result of 
withdrawn and lapsed cases and avoiding adjournments. Looking specifically at the types 
of opt-in cases, it was calculated that cases that were subject to both stages of the ADR 
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process cost on average £188 per case. The unit cost for this type of case was lower as 
it was more likely to avoid subsequent hearing and adjournment costs, given the rate of 
withdrawn and lapsed cases amongst this group.
The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which came into force in November 
2008, introduced a number of operational reforms which had the potential to reduce some 
of the additional costs incurred in delivering the ADR process during the pilot period. If this 
was found to reduce additional DTJ time inputs, the overall costs incurred in delivering the 
ADR process would be significantly reduced. This, combined with the costs saved through 
avoidance of first hearings where cases were lapsed or withdrawn, and the avoidance of 
second hearings where hearings were adjourned would have the potential to lead to an 
overall cost saving where ADR is used when compared to use of the traditional process only. 
However, further analysis is required to explore the assumption that the current operating 
costs would result in a reduction in cost of delivering the ADR process.
The different profile of opt-in cases that was evident through the pilot must be considered in 
respect of future costs. As the ADR pilot progressed there was an increasing emphasis through 
the ENE reviews on strengthening the case evidence and ensuring that appellants’ cases 
were presented as strongly as possible, including encouraging appellants to attend an oral 
hearing where they had previously opted for a paper hearing. This was reflected in the higher 
proportion of opt-in cases that were identified as stage one ADR process cases. Dealing with 
these type of cases was less costly than stage one and two ADR process cases as, although 
they incurred the additional costs of the DTJ conducting ENE, they did not include the costs 
of the telephone call. The high level of directions issued also served to prevent adjournments 
at the hearing, thus saving the costs of a second hearing. However, these cases, in turn, did 
not generate the same level of avoided hearings and consequential costs savings as stage 
one and two ADR cases. This posed a risk to the cost-effectiveness of the future roll out of the 
process should this emphasis continue. There would be merit in exploring whether the benefits 
of the ENE review can be achieved at a lower cost to minimise the impact it has on the overall 
cost-effectiveness of the process. Further study also needs to be conducted, alongside testing 
the impact of the TCE Act, of the potential hidden costs associated with ADR, such as the costs 
incurred in backfilling the normal duties of the salaried DTJs to allow a more rounded picture of 
the cost-effectiveness of the ADR process to be developed.
Were appellants satisfied with the process? 
Appellants’ satisfaction with the appeal process was generally linked to the outcome they 
achieved. Despite this, a number of areas of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the ADR 
process as part of the appeal were evident. Overall, appellants who had a telephone call 
were satisfied with the process for the call, even if they did not agree with what the DTJ 
was saying. The confidential nature of the call, the sympathetic tone, the independence 
and manner adopted by the DTJs and the opportunity to simply have someone to talk the 
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case through with were areas identified by appellants as factors that contributed to their 
satisfaction. Where dissatisfaction was expressed with the DTJ’s telephone call, it tended 
to be because appellants did not like the advice being given or disliked the impersonality of 
the process. There were also higher levels of satisfaction with the ADR process as a whole 
where appellants had wanted to avoid a stressful hearing or the cost and time of travel to a 
hearing and ADR offered the opportunity to do this.
There were a number of areas for improvement identified that would enhance appellant 
satisfaction with the ADR process, should it continue. There were instances (32 cases) 
where it had not been possible for the DTJ to make phone contact with the appellant. For 
appellants, this made them feel that they had not had the opportunity to actively participate 
in ADR and they were not in control of their situation. Appellants, likewise, were dissatisfied 
when they received little further communication following opting into ADR. Where this 
experience led to appellants feeling disempowered, this posed a risk that appellants would 
not opt for any future opportunity to use ADR again. 
Were there any other impacts of ADR?
A number of more qualitative impacts, which were less tangible than the quantitative outputs, 
were identified from the ADR pilot. These related to the appellants’ experience of the appeal 
process as well as outcomes generated for staff involved in pilot delivery. For example, 
impacts were generated in terms of reducing the stress which appellants often reported to 
feel as a result of participating in the appeal process. This outcome was identified by many 
appellants as a benefit of the ADR process. This was achieved, in one sense, by giving 
appellants greater confidence in their case by offering a discussion with an independent and 
knowledgeable person. This would ultimately benefit the appeals process by encouraging 
appellants to attend the oral hearing and provide a better quality of evidence. 
Tribunals Service staff, DTJs and the PDCS recognised that the ADR process had helped to 
establish a level of liaison and effective working relations between the different stakeholder 
organisations which would not otherwise exist as contact between agencies outside of the 
ADR pilot was limited. Professional development opportunities, particularly for Tribunals 
Service administrative clerks also emerged from the ADR pilot as the introduction of the ADR 
pilot created additional administrative tasks. It was clear, however, that the Tribunals Service 
administrative staff involved in the pilot were carefully selected to ensure effective delivery 
of the process. The success of any subsequent roll out of the process will be dependent on 
the provision of a suitable staff training programme to ensure the wider pool of staff are fully 
prepared to assist the smooth running of the process. 
The impact of the ADR pilot on the operation of listings and management of session capacity 
was a concern that emerged. There was a risk to meeting the performance target for listing 
times where cases were re-referred for ENE following the request for additional information. 
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There would be merit in exploring the specific impact of ADR on these performance targets 
to assess the extent of the impact to inform any necessary strategies or processes to ensure 
continued performance in this regard and that administrative personnel are not penalised for 
any delays in listing cases which are being processed via ADR. This may involve exploring 
the fit between external contractors’ timescales for delivering medical examination reports 
and the listing targets.
What impact did ADR have on the PDCS?
There was a cost implication for PDCS participation in the ADR pilot, estimated to be £3,224, 
incurred mainly through Decision-Maker Manager time in reviewing the cases in preparation for 
the call from the DTJ. The only element of cost savings identified for the PDCS was the saving 
associated with the Presenting Officer attending the hearing; however, this saving was relatively 
small (£1,009) given that Presenting Officers only attend seven per cent of complex appeals. 
There was evidence to suggest that ADR impacted on PDCS in terms of contributing 
to a stronger sense of shared responsibility between PDCS and the Tribunals Service 
for the efficient and proportionate conclusion of appeals. This was principally being 
achieved through the opportunity for PDCS to speak to DTJs through the telephone call, 
which provided a greater insight into the decision-making process of the judiciary in the 
appeals process. The direct feedback from the DTJ during telephone calls to the PDCS or 
alternatively by PDCS staff themselves through the review of cases in preparation for this call 
was referred to as a both a support and an incentive for general performance improvement 
and a tool for coaching staff. However, overall, PDCS received fewer calls than expected as 
a result of ADR, so while useful insights into quality assurance have resulted it was unlikely 
that ADR has impacted on quality assurance across the wider PDCS operation.
The relatively low number of phone calls made to PDCS could potentially affect their views on 
ADR should the option to roll out nationally be taken. There could be an issue in ensuring PDCS’s 
continued engagement in the process if the number of cases leading to a phone call to the PDCS 
continues to be low and the perception persists that the input from PDCS in reviewing cases 
was not justified given the number of calls. Communication by letter on cases where the call has 
been made to the appellant or reverted to the non-ADR route could be helpful to maintain PDCS 
confidence in the process, although this was not a direct suggestion from the PDCS.
What do others (non-parties) think of ADR?
Welfare rights groups overall held positive views on the ADR process, and typically focused 
on the benefits that the process could yield for appellants, which was reflected in the advice 
they would give to appellants to encourage opt-in. There was some evidence, however, 
of some welfare rights groups not being as familiar with the process as others. There was 
limited evidence that this was impacting negatively on appellant opt-in as the agencies did 
not have sufficient knowledge to support appellants to make decisions to opt-in. There would 
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be merit in refreshing welfare rights groups’ knowledge should the process continue and 
ongoing communication provides an opportunity to further raise awareness of the positive 
outcomes achieved by ADR as a mechanism to enhance continued opt-in. Disseminating 
information about ADR to the wider agencies involved in advocacy and representation of 
appellants also has the scope to build a clearer, more appropriate evidence base for appeals 
to move through the appeals process more quickly and more efficiently. While welfare rights 
group representatives welcomed the DTJ telephone call as a useful element of the ADR 
process, there was recognition that for appellants the call from the DTJ could come ‘out of 
the blue’. It was suggested that it was important that in all cases the DTJ suggested that the 
appellant get some advice before making any decision. 
Why do some appellants not opt into the ADR process?
There was evidence that appellants made both active and passive decisions not to opt into 
the ADR process. The inconsistency of the ADR letter being sent out throughout a substantial 
period of the pilot’s operation was a key reason appellants did not opt-in, as they were simply 
not given the opportunity. This was subsequently resolved with the responsibility for sending 
out the letters being transferred to the Tribunals Service. Among appellants who did receive 
the opt-in letter, the level of understanding of the ADR process and the implications and 
opportunities it presented for appellants during the appeal process was mixed. This was a 
key reason why appellants did not opt-in. Although the letter complied with DWP accessibility 
requirements there was an acknowledgement by some Tribunals Service staff and welfare 
rights group representatives of a need to improve the explanation of the process articulated 
through the ADR letter to aid understanding. Rather than a full rewrite, an ‘easy read’ version 
of the letter would be helpful, combined with additional information on the options and routes 
for getting further information to aid active and informed choices to opt-in. Other appellants 
were identified as making more active and informed choices not to opt-in to the process, 
specifically as ADR was seen as a less attractive option compared to an oral hearing. 
Alternatively, looking at the reasons appellants chose to opt-in, some appellants made 
active decisions, focused on specific positive benefits of the process, backed by a genuine 
understanding of the process. Other appellants were prepared to try something new or 
‘alternative’ to the existing system, to speed the process up, to have someone to discuss 
the case with, to get an independent eye over the case, or, because they felt desperate. In 
contrast, there were other appellants who had obviously made a passive decision and signed 
the opt-in form, as their case was going through the ADR process. However, they were not 
clear that this was what they had done or why. For other appellants the decision was taken 
by a support worker, carer or welfare rights group representative, potentially undermining the 
extent to which appellants were able to exercise their choice to opt-in to the ADR process.
Cases where opt-in letters had been signed but where ADR did not take place need some 
attention should the process continue in order to ensure appellants’ confidence in ADR and 
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the wider appeal process is not undermined. Where no contact was made and no action 
taken by appellants, these cases could be ill-prepared as a result and possibly more likely 
to lead to adjournment or negative outcomes for the appellant. An opportunity for good 
news was also potentially being missed by not providing appellants with any subsequent 
information about how their case had progressed through the ADR process. There was no 
direct evidence from appellants about how they would prefer to receive this information but it 
could be in written form or over the telephone. However, this could be a potentially resource 
intensive process against which the benefits need to be weighed.
Pilot recommendations
Given the mixed findings concerning the operation and outputs achieved by certain elements 
of the ADR process, the overall conclusion was that there is a recommendation for a limited 
roll out into a wider and geographically diverse set of areas. This would need, however, to 
be accompanied by continuous testing and monitoring before stronger conclusions could be 
made about potential complete national roll out. This approach would also allow changes to 
the existing model based on a number of variants and the capacity to deliver ADR on a larger 
scale, over a longer period to be tested and in the context of the revised operating context 
following the TCE Act 2007. 
There are two parts to the specific recommendations. Firstly, recommendations for 
improvements or changes to the process as it stands are made, before considering 
recommendations for developing alternative models for ADR utilising the most effective 
elements of the process.
If the ADR process were to continue with the model as it was tested in the pilot, the following 
changes are recommended.
 ● Changes under the Tribunals and Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which changed 
responsibility for sending the pre-hearing enquiry form to the Tribunals Service, 
appeared to have gone some way to resolve the issue of the inconsistency of the 
ADR letter being sent out. This is a fundamental point affecting the underlying need for 
voluntary participation to obtain one of the established advantages of ADR processes 
generally. Continued monitoring would be needed to ensure this continued to work 
effectively to provide an opportunity for appellants to make an active and informed 
choice to participate in the process. 
 ● The evidence from appellants and some staff points to a need to improve the explanation of 
the process articulated through the ADR letter. There would be merit in further examination 
of how the letter could be altered to be ‘easy read’, but still including a simplified description 
of the initiative and what appellants could expect from the process. There is also a need 
to make the options and routes for getting further information, other than contacting the 
Tribunals Service, clearer in the letter to aid active and informed choices to opt-in. 
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 ● Dissemination of information about the pilot to local support groups would also serve to 
provide additional sources of support and information for appellants who may struggle to 
understand the opt-in letter. The feasibility of a Tribunals Service clerk being available to 
explain ADR to appellants or welfare rights groups should also be explored.
 ● The introduction of the ADR pilot has created additional administrative tasks, but removal of 
the key and most onerous tasks associated with data collection for the pilot exercise leads 
to more manageable responsibilities for administrative clerks. However, consideration must 
be given to the selection of staff to support the process if it is continued in any form to ensure 
the efficient administrative work of the administrative clerks for the pilot is continued.
 ● The impact of the ADR pilot on the operation of listings and management of session capacity 
was clear from the pilot exercise. There was a risk to meeting the performance target 
for listing times where cases are re-referred for ADR following the request for additional 
information. A strategy would need to be put in place to manage this, particularly if the impact 
increases due to an increase in number of cases. The filtering of ‘suitable’ cases will become 
increasingly important as the flow of cases increases so there would be merit in setting 
some broad criteria for the filtering of cases to ensure consistency across areas. 
 ● There was evidence from the pilot that at times the DTJs’ capacity to manage the flow of 
ADR opt-in cases had been reached. Careful planning of capacity and workloads will be 
necessary in any future use of the ADR process to ensure effective delivery.
 ● Appellants and their representatives widely suggested that the communication process 
needed to be improved so that they were in touch with what was happening during the 
ADR process, and so they could track progress on their case. Consideration should be 
given to suitable communication mechanisms with appellants, particularly those whose 
cases do not proceed through ADR following opt-in and PDCS to maintain confidence 
in the process. The feasibility of a closure letter sent to appellants at the end of their 
cases involvement with the ADR process to explain the progress of their case should be 
explored, although potentially this would increase costs. 
 ● The positive views of appellants on the opportunity to speak to the DTJ and the impact 
it has on their cases was undermined by the disempowerment felt by appellants who 
have missed their opportunity to speak to a DTJ. There would be merit in establishing 
procedures for cases where appellants are not contacted during the three attempts to 
ensure that sufficient opportunities are provided for appellants to be actively involved in 
the ADR process where appropriate.
 ● Further consideration should be given to route-ways six and seven, where an appellant is 
contacted as the losing party but does not withdraw. In a proportion of these cases the DTJs 
were incorrect in their opinion that the appellant would be the losing party as the appellant 
subsequently went on to achieve a better outcome. Although they were small samples, only 
four per cent of the total opt-in sample, they need some further study to ensure they do not 
undermine an appellant’s access to justice through a tribunal panel. There was also a risk to 
the reputation of ADR given the potential for appellants’ dissatisfaction if they were contacted 
to withdraw their case but then win their appeal at a hearing.
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If a further testing of the ADR process was pursued, it would also provide the opportunity 
to test alternative models of ADR that could achieve the benefits of the process while 
addressing some of the areas for improvement or less effective parts of the process. These 
alternatives may include the following.
 ● The evidence from DTJs suggests that conducting ENE for first claims tends to be 
quicker as there was less evidence or history and it tends to be a single-issue case. 
There would be merit in focusing any roll out of the ADR process on these cases. This 
would minimise the time required by DTJs in previewing cases. Procedures could also 
be drawn up to give DTJs guidance on how long to engage with a file. 
 ● One option could be to roll out the initial light touch review of cases, which was used as 
a mechanism in the pilot to identify cases which were suitable for ENE and subsequent 
ADR activities. This light touch review would serve to quickly identify cases which are 
suitable for stage one and two of the ADR process. It could efficiently identify where 
directions could usefully be issued to enhance the case preparedness as it proceeds 
to a hearing, thus retaining the benefits of the ENE element of the process in terms of 
strengthening the case evidence. Applying this only to new claims would serve to ensure 
efficient completion of this review, given the shorter time typically required to review 
these cases. If broad criteria could be set for the identification of suitability of cases and 
circumstances where directions could be issued, consideration could be given to this 
task being undertaken by staff other than members of the judiciary which would reduce 
the costs associated with task. 
 ● The contacting of the losing party element of the process, should this be retained, 
leads to cases being withdrawn or lapsed which has clearly been shown to generate 
the greatest cost savings from the ADR process. Alternative models, such as using 
written communication or facilitating contact through a representative organisation 
could be utilised for contacting the losing party. The use of written communication would 
overcome the issues identified in the pilot with contacting appellants ‘out of the blue’. 
However it would not be appropriate for those with literacy needs, hence the need for 
involvement by representatives. It would also address the concerns on the part of the 
PDCS about the low number of calls received in the pilot and their relative input in 
terms of reviewing cases. Receiving the outcome of the review in a written form means 
that their review of cases could take place at a time convenient to them. There would, 
however, be a need to explore the potential impact this approach would have on staff 
time in producing and sending out the written communication which would need to be 
weighed against the costs of the DTJ time used in conducting this task.
 ● There were also clear benefits through the contact with appellants in terms of clarifying 
points of law, and encouraging appellants to attend the appeal hearing in person which 
alternatively achieves better-evidenced hearings. This could, however, be done by 
someone other than DTJ to minimise the costs associated with this task. 
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Appendix A: Evaluation research key and sub-questions
Key Research Questions
Does ADR result in swifter, more proportionate resolution of cases?
How many cases were resolved without the need for a tribunal hearing?
How many cases proceeded to a full hearing in spite of the application of ADR? 
What is the impact of the pilot on appeal clearance time/case duration? Are cases where an ADR has 
been applied resolved faster overall compared to cases going through normal SSCSA processes?
Where cases went to a full hearing after the ADR, were there fewer adjournments (e.g. resulting 
from better preparation)?
How did this vary according to the different types of appellants (e.g. disabling condition, demographics)?
How accurate was the DC’s advice (how well did the DC’s opinion match the outcomes of appeals 
that went to full hearing)? Where the DC’s opinion was different to that of the panel at a subsequent 
hearing, why was that the case (e.g. new evidence etc)?
Is ADR cost effective?
How much did it cost to provide ADR services (e.g. in judicial and administrative time)? 
How much (tribunal) money was saved through ADR (i.e. through the reduction in tribunal hearings/
adjournments and associated costs)?
What was the additional cost of conducting ENEs where the DCs advice was not acted upon?
Did ADR provide an overall cost benefit for SSCSA?
Were appellants satisfied with the process? 
What did appellants think of Early Neutral Evaluation? Were they content with it as a means of 
resolving their appeal? 
Did the appellant know why they were contacted by the DC (i.e. did they know what they had 
entered into and what this would mean for them?
How does their satisfaction with the various elements of the process (including with the information 
they received) compare to appellants going through normal SSCSA processes?
How did appellants feel about the change/opportunity to discuss the case with a DC? 
What did they think of the documents/information they were given on ADR?
Were there any other impacts of ADR?
Did ADR encourage appellants to seek advice/provide better evidence which resulted in a successful 
appeal?
What impact did the letter offering ADR have on the timely return of the TAS 1 form (i.e. on the 
proportion of strike outs and subsequent reinstatements, and the resulting impact on the customer 
and the SSCSA of this)?
What effect did ADR have on listing and management of session capacity as a result of any 
reductions in hearings?
What other benefits or drawbacks were there of ADR?
What impact did ADR have on the DCS?
 How much time did DCS additional time did decision-makers spend on cases as a result of ADR?
Was there any time/cost saving to the DCS?
What did DCS decision-makers think of the process?
What do others (non-parties) think of ADR?
What do representatives and user-groups (who have contact with the pilot) think of ADR?
What do TS staff (District Chairmen, administrative staff involved in the pilot) think of the process?
Why do some appellants not opt into the ADR process?
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Appendix B:  Methodological Annex
Methodology
The following sections detail the methodology for the evaluation of the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution pilot. 
Inception, development and familiarisation
Familiarisation 
At the outset of the study, ECOTEC staff undertook a familiarisation visit to the Sutton pilot. 
This involved meeting key staff and exploring the processes involved including looking at files 
and observing a Tribunal in practice. 
Engaging an expert advisor
ECOTEC proposed to engage an expert advisor throughout the evaluation. This role 
involved briefings and peer review of research tools, analysis and all report outputs. 
Professor Trevor Buck from De Montfort University was approached and ECOTEC 
attended an initial meeting with Professor Buck in November 2007 where he agreed to act 
as an expert advisor for the evaluation. 
Briefing meeting
During the inception stage, ECOTEC organised a briefing meeting involving presentations by 
Professor Buck and the Tribunals Service Regional Chairman, Jeremy Bennett. This briefing 
focused on the background and context of ADR and specifically ENE approaches. The 
briefing was attended by all evaluation staff, key contacts from MoJ and the Tribunals Service 
and Professor Buck. The meeting ensured all staff were sufficiently briefed to facilitate 
interviews and undertake data analysis. 
Design of data collection tools
Customised topic guides for use in the interviews were designed for:
 ● opt-in appellants and representatives;
 ● non-opt-in appellants and representatives;
 ● PDCS staff;
 ● members of the Judiciary; 
 ● Tribunals Service administrative staff;
 ● user/representative groups.
Pilot appellant interviews
As part of the inception stage, nine pilot appellant interviews (five opt-in and four non-opted- 
in appellants) were conducted in Sutton during December 2007 and January 2008. These 
interviews allowed piloting of the recruitment and interview tools. Following these interviews 
there was a need to revise the topic guides to enhance the interview flow in certain parts. 
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Quantitative data analysis
The principal task to answer the key research question of whether ADR results in swifter, 
more proportionate resolution of cases involved manipulation and analysis of spreadsheets, 
which were designed and completed for the purpose of the pilot. These spreadsheets were 
maintained by Tribunals Service administration staff at each pilot site. The spreadsheet 
included fields to gather information on key stages in the progress of a case through the 
appeal process. Separate spreadsheets were completed for opt-in and non-opt-in cases to 
allow a comparison element.
Sample size
To ensure the sample of cases on the spreadsheets was of sufficient size, MoJ and the 
Tribunals Service agreed to extend the pilot and evaluation to January 2009. From August 
2008, the pilot was also rolled out in two additional areas – Cardiff and Bexleyheath – within 
the existing pilot regions. 
Copies of the spreadsheets were supplied at key points of the evaluation to inform the 
production of report outputs. Given the ongoing nature of the cases, not every case within 
the spreadsheets had sufficient information to undergo intensive analysis at the time 
the spreadsheets were provided. A system was devised to select a sample for analysis, 
essentially identifying and labelling cases that had concluded. Those which were not 
concluded at the time of the analysis were excluded.
Analysis approach 
Analysis of the data focused around the seven measurable outcomes from the pilot and 
process involved. The analysis process involved labelling each case with an outcome type by 
identifying a number of key milestones and activities within each case.
There was a need to combine some route-ways as the information contained on the 
spreadsheet did not allow for their differentiation. For example, the spreadsheet did not record 
any information to distinguish whether the PDCS reconsidered their decision and if so whether 
it was not in an appellant’s favour. Additional data were also needed to distinguish whether an 
appellant was happy or not with a revised decision following the case lapsing and whether they 
decided to appeal again. The other outcomes where the ADR process potentially could have 
influenced the speed or quality of the process were examined separately.
Once an outcome label had been attached to a case, detailed analysis was then undertaken 
using Microsoft Excel to interrogate the data using formulas and sorting mechanisms. A 
detailed approach to the quantitative analysis was agreed between MoJ, the Tribunals 
Service and ECOTEC. Broadly, the first part of the analysis focused on counts of cases with 
different milestones and activities associated with the opt-in ADR and non-opt-in process, 
with cross tabulations calculated for different characteristics of cases. The second strand 
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of analysis focused on whether ADR resulted in swifter progress of a case. Specifically, 
formulas were generated to calculate the average working days between key milestones/
activities. The final strand of the analysis was establishing a way in which to measure the 
extent of change in decisions and where within the ADR process the largest change in 
decisions were made. Two approaches were taken to establishing this.
 ● Identifying ‘change’ in each appeal – this was done by looking at each appeal and 
allocating an up/down or same code to each for the mobility and care component to 
represent change between the PDCS decision, DTJ decision and to the decision of the 
Tribunal.
 ● Establishing the extent and nature of change – a system was devised whereby the 
difference between each decision was allocated a number from minus three to three. 
A score of zero would indicate no change in decision (for example, between the PDCS 
decision and the evaluation decision), a one would indicate that the decision had gone 
up one level (e.g. zero to lower rate) etc., with negative figures denoting a decrease. An 
average was then calculated, the closer the average score between decisions was to 
zero, the more similar the decision between the different points.
This analysis took place at three points: in June 2008 to coincide with the interim report; in 
October 2008 to provide an update on the performance of the pilot; and in January 2009 to 
coincide with providing data for the final report. 
Qualitative interviews
A key strand of data collection for the evaluation was qualitative research with staff, participants 
and stakeholders involved in the ADR process. These interviews sought to gather their views 
and perceptions of the process and impact of the pilot from different perspectives. 
Interviews with Tribunals Service staff and members of the Judiciary
Interviews were undertaken with administration and management staff from the Tribunals 
Service who were engaged in delivering the pilot in each area, including the new areas –
Cardiff and Bexleyheath – where the pilot was rolled out to in August 2008. A total of seven 
face-to-face interviews were undertaken. The same management staff were responsible 
for overseeing the operation of ADR in the additional areas once the pilot was rolled out, as 
they typically had operational responsibility for wider Tribunals Service regions. Additional 
interviews were undertaken to include the administration clerks responsible for the new areas 
when they came on stream. 
Face-to-face interviews were also conducted with four District Tribunal Judges in total, 
two from each pilot region, who were responsible for conducting ENEs. Interviews were 
conducted initially with DTJs working in the Sutton area in April 2008, and additional 
telephone interviews were conducted in January 2009 to capture additional information about 
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the impact of the Bexleyheath area coming on stream. The timing of the interviews with DTJs 
responsible for Bristol and Cardiff, in November 2008, meant information about both areas 
could be captured.
Interviews with Pension, Disability and Carers Service representatives
The evaluation involved four interviews with PDCS staff. These interviews were 
predominantly conducted on a face-to-face basis, but telephone interviewing was used for 
one interview as it proved more cost-effective given the geographical base of PDCS staff. 
Interviews with appellants
A key strand of the evaluation was conducting interviews with appellants to gather 
information on their satisfaction with the process and the impacts of ADR. The researchers 
were aware, however, of the potential vulnerability of these individuals and used suitable 
approaches in undertaking these interviews.
Introductory letters played a key role in encouraging and securing informed participation in 
the research, something that is particularly important when researching vulnerable groups. 
For the purpose of this project, the researchers developed an ‘easy read’ introductory letter 
for the project, outlining its aims and objectives, what help they needed from appellants, 
explaining that the interviews would be confidential and spelling out what this meant in terms 
of the storage and use of data. The researchers also encouraged participation by offering 
interpretation and support services where required, for example, making appellants aware 
that they could have an advocate present at the interview with them, for example a social 
worker, carer or other representative. Financial incentives were offered to appellants to thank 
them for their time and involvement. 
The original sample profile focused on conducting 40 interviews with appellants in each pilot 
area to include both those who had opted in for the ADR process and a smaller sample of 
those who had not opted in. Over the course of the evaluation this sample profile evolved 
to include a small number of appellants from Cardiff and Bexleyheath. Some targeted 
recruitment within the opt-in sample also became necessary as it became clear that there 
was a smaller than expected sample of appellants who experienced both stages of the ADR 
process and were contacted by DTJs. Within this sample the researchers sought to include 
different types of appellant, for example by disabling condition or demographics, although 
no set quotas were set and given the qualitative nature of the interviews, findings were not 
stratified by appellant type. 
Interviews with welfare rights groups
This element of the qualitative fieldwork focused on gathering the views from welfare rights 
groups or support organisations that represent or work with appellants through the appeal 
process. The researchers conducted eight interviews in total.
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Unit cost analysis
A key objective of the evaluation was focused on assessing the cost-effectiveness of the 
pilot. The researchers’ approach to this was the development of average unit costs for 
different elements or key staff in the pilot, based on fixed costs or calculations based on 
time inputs. These were then used to produce average costs associated with each route 
to the seven outcomes of the process based on a sample of cases to allow analysis of any 
cost savings or additional cost associated with the ADR process compare to the traditional 
appeals process.
Average unit costs were developed for the following aspects of the ADR process.
Costs Availability for analysis
Costs of hearing (venue/medical and disability 
member fees)
Available from Tribunals Service Finance Team. 
Average unit costs developed to allow average 
cost for opt-in/ opt out route ways, taking into 
account increase or reduction in adjournments.
Costs of administrative time inputs A time sheet was used to gather information on 
administrative time inputs to develop an average 
cost for administrative associated with opt-in, opt 
out route ways.
Costs of DTJ time inputs (doing ENE, making 
calls to PDCS/appellants, attending the hearing)
Time inputs recorded on pilot spreadsheet to 
develop an average cost for opt-in, opt out route 
ways.
Costs to the appellant (attending the hearing etc) Information on average appellant reimbursable 
costs for attending a hearing, available from 
Tribunals Service Finance Team. 
PDCS costs Provided by PDCS
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Appendix C:  Full quantitative results
Quantitative results
Statistical reliability
The sample tolerances that apply to the percentage results in this report are given in the 
table below. This table shows the possible variation that might be anticipated because a 
sample, rather than the entire population, was examined. As indicated, sampling tolerances 
vary with the size of the sample and the size of the percentage results.
Table C.1: Approximate sampling tolerances applicable to percentages at or 
near these levels
Size of sample on which 
results are based
10% or 90% 30% or 70% 50%
± ± ±
100 interviews 6 9 10
200 interviews 4 6 7
300 interviews 3 5 6
400 interviews 3 5 5
500 interviews 3 4 4
600 interviews 2 4 4
700 interviews 2 3 4
800 interviews 2 3 4
900 interviews 2 3 3
1,000 interviews 2 3 3
For example, where 50% of the population in a sample of 500 respond with a particular result, 
the chances are 95 in 100 that this result would not vary by more than four percentage points, 
plus or minus, from a complete coverage of the entire population using the same procedures.
Tolerances are also involved in the comparison of results from different parts of the sample. 
A difference, in other words, must be of at least a certain size to be considered statistically 
significant. The following table is a guide to the sampling tolerances applicable to comparisons.
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Table C.2:  Differences required for significance at or near these percentages 
Size of sample on which 
results are based
10% or 90% 30% or 70% 50%
± ± ±
100 and 100 8 13 14
100 and 200 7 11 12
100 and 300 7 10 11
100 and 400 7 10 11
100 and 500 7 10 11
200 and 200 7 10 11
200 and 300 5 8 9
200 and 400 5 8 9
200 and 500 5 8 8
300 and 300 5 7 8
300 and 400 5 7 8
300 and 500 4 7 7
400 and 400 4 6 7
400 and 500 4 6 7
500 and 500 4 6 6
1,000 and 1,000 3 4 4
Results by pilot area
The following tables complement the overall findings presented in the main body and refer to 
the findings for the different pilot areas.
Table C.3:  Total cases and sample sizes available for analysis per pilot area
Opt-in cases Non-opt-in cases
Sutton
Total flow of cases: 541 Total flow of cases: 643
Sample for analysis: 432 Sample for analysis: 593
Bristol
Total flow of cases: 488 Total flow of cases: 345
Sample for analysis: 321 Sample for analysis: 226
Cardiff
Total flow of cases: 318 Total flow of cases: 283
Sample for analysis: 136 Sample for analysis: 148
Bexley Heath
Total flow of cases: 180 Total flow of cases: 200
Sample for analysis: 89 Sample for analysis: 136
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Table C.4:  Profile of opt-in cases
Stage one and 
two ADR Process 
(ENE & telephone 
call to losing 
party) 
Stage one ADR 
Process (ENE 
only)
No ADR process 
(Insufficient 
resources/lack of 
time) Total opt-in cases
Sutton 168 (39%) 248 (57%) 16 (4%) 432 (100%)
Bristol 47 (15%) 265 (83%) 9 (3%) 321 (100%)
Cardiff 10 (7%) 123 (90%) 3 (2%) 136 (100%)
Bexleyheath 24 (27%) 61 (69%) 4 (4%) 89 (100%)
Total All Areas 249 697 32 978
Table C.5:  Profile of telephone calls made by DTJs to appellants and PDCS
Total stage one 
and two ADR 
cases
Appellant 
contacted by DTJ 
(Proportion of 
stage one and two 
ADR cases where 
contact made)
Representative 
contacted by DTJ 
(Proportion of 
stage one and two 
ADR cases where 
contact made)
PDCS contacted 
by DTJ 
(Proportion of 
cases where 
contact made)
Sutton 168 (100%) 49 (29%) 23 (14%) 96 (57%)
Bristol 47 (100%) 18 (38%) 12 (26%) 17 (36%)
Cardiff 10 (100%) 3 (30%) 0 (0%) 7 (70%)
Bexleyheath 24 (100%) 6 (25%) 3 (13%) 15 (63%)
Total all areas 249 76 38 135
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Table C.6:  Opt-in cases by outcome
Outcome
Sutton Bristol Cardiff
Bexley-
heath
Total opt-in 
cases all 
areas
Number of cases/Proportion of total opt-in cases in area
1 ENE not carried out 
insufficient resources - 
hearing as normal
16 (4%) 9 (3%) 3 (2%) 4 (4%) 32 (3%)
2 Not suitable for ADR 
or insufficient evidence 
to identify losing party, 
hearing as normal
204 (47%) 201 (63%) 109 (80%) 44 (49%) 558 (57%)
3 PDCS losing party but 
decision not revised
20 (5%) 8 (3%) 2 (1%) 1 (1%) 31 (3%)
4 PDCS losing party and 
appeal lapses
110 (25%) 44 (14%) 15 (11%) 22 (25%) 191 (19%)
5 Appellant losing 
party and appellant 
withdraws
16 (4%) 18 (6%) 3 (2%) 5 (6%) 42 (4%)
6 Appellant losing party, 
further evidence 
received but hearing 
as normal
24 (6%) 30 (9%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 55 (6%)
7 Appellant losing party 
but no action taken, 
hearing as normal
42 (10%) 11 (3%) 4 (3%) 12 (13%) 69 (7%)
Total cases per area 432 (100%) 321 (100%) 136 (100%) 89 (100%) 978 (100%)
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Table C.8: Proportion of cases adjourned at the first hearing
Stage one and two 
ADR Opt-in cases 
(Outcome 3-10  
(N=249 cases
Stage one ADR 
Opt-in cases 
(Outcome 2 
(N=697 cases
All ADR Opt-in 
cases  
(N=946 cases
Non-opt in cases 
(N=1103 cases
Sutton 15 (9%) 19 (8%) 34 (8%) 120 (20%)
Bristol 7 (15%) 38 (14%) 45 (15%) 41 (18%)
Cardiff 0 (0%) 6 (5%) 6 (5%) 19 (13%)
Bexleyheath 0 (0%) 6 (10%) 6 (7%)  15 (11%)
Total for All 
Areas
22 (9%) 63 (9%) 85 (9%) 195 (18%)
Table C.9:  Nature of directions issued in all opt-in cases at ENE stage
Medical 
examination 
/GP Report
Convert 
from paper 
to oral 
hearing
Obtain 
further 
evidence Seek advice Other
Total cases 
where 
directions 
issued
Sutton 76 (52%) 32 (22%) 19 (13%) 2 (1%) 17 (12%) 146 (100%)
Bristol 64 (36%) 55 (31%) 13 (7%) 0 (0%) 47 (26%) 179 (100%)
Cardiff 24 (44%) 18 (33%) 3 (5%) 0 (0%) 10 (18%) 55 (100%)
Bexley-
heath
12 (60%) 7 (35%) 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 20 (100%)
Total 
All 
Areas
176 (44%) 112 (28%) 36 (9%) 2 (1%) 74 (19%) 400 (100%)
Table C.10: Profile of opt-in cases where directions issued and their 
outcomes per area
Withdrawal Lapse Hearing
Adjournment 
at first 
hearing
Total cases 
where 
directions 
issued
Sutton 0 (0%) 32 (21%) 93 (64%) 21 (%) 146 (100%)
Bristol 11 (6%) 24 (13%) 112 (63%) 32 (18%) 179 (100%)
Cardiff 1 (2%) 7 (13%)  45 (82%) 2 (4%) 55 (100%)
Bexleyheath 1 (5%) 9 (45%) 10 (50%) 0 (0%) 20 (100%)
Total All Areas 13 (3%) 72 (18%) 260 (65%) 55 (14%) 400 (100%)
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Table C.11: Overall average time taken to resolve opt-in cases-working days
ADR cases (all)
Stage one 
and two ADR 
process 
(Outcome 3-10)
Stage one 
ADR process 
(Outcome 2) Non-ADR cases
Sutton 36 30 39 33
Bristol 56 50 59 55
Cardiff 51 28 53 46
Bexleyheath 39 29 44 33
Average for all areas 46 34 49 42
Table C.12: Average time for opt-in cases between start of appeal, listing 
and case resolution-directions and no directions
Average time 
between start 
of appeal and 
appeal listing 
(All cases)
Average time 
between start 
of appeal and 
appeal listing 
(Cases with 
directions 
issued)
Average time 
between start of 
appeal and case 
resolution  
(All cases)
Average time 
between start 
of appeal and 
case resolution 
(Cases with) 
directions 
issued
Sutton 13 20 36 48
Bristol 20 25 56 61
Cardiff 29 39 50 60
Bexleyheath 15 30 39 49
Average for all areas 19 29 45 55
Table C13: Average time for achieving outcomes - working days
Pre-enquiry 
form 
received 
and the 
date 
withdrawn
Pre-enquiry 
form 
received 
and the 
date appeal 
lapsed
Pre-enquiry 
form 
received 
and case 
resolution 
at 1st 
hearing
Case 
resolution 
at 2nd 
hearing
Case 
resolution 
at 3rd 
hearing
Sutton
All Opt-in 35 22 37 65 75
Non-opt- in 35 42 25 62 99
Bristol
All Opt-in 52 32 56 95 98
Non-opt-in 63 49 47 103 81
Cardiff
All Opt-in 27 29 54 92 N/A
Non-opt-in 31 22 44 71 69
Bexleyheath
All Opt-in 36 26 42 56 N/A
Non-opt-in 19 32 30 64 N/A
Average all 
areas
All Opt-in 37 27 47 77 86
Non-opt- in 37 36 36 75 83
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Appendix D:  Future cost calculations
Future cost calculations
The calculations associated with potential future costs of the ADR process if it were rolled out 
more widely are shown below. The calculations are based on the following assumptions and 
data.
 ● Some 73,480 DLA appeal cases are dealt with in a 12-month period.
 ● The rate of cases opting into the pilot would be 78% (as in the pilot).
 ● The profile of opt-in cases would be the same as in the pilot (25% stage one and two 
ADR cases, 71% stage one ADR cases, 3% no ADR process cases).
 ● Net unit costs for dealing with the different types of cases are: stage one and two ADR 
cases – £185, stage one ADR cases – £231 and, non-opt-in and no ADR process cases 
– £202.
Table D1: Future cost calculations
Calculation Assumptions Calculation results
Number of opt-in and 
non-opt-in cases
Total number of DLA cases: 73,480 73,480/100*78 = 57,314 cases 
would be subject to the ADR process
Proportion of opt-in cases: 78% 73,480/100*22 = 16,166 cases 
would be non-opt-in cases and 
subject to the ‘normal’ processProportion of non-opt-in cases: 22%
Number of different type 
of ADR opt-in cases 
Stage one and two ADR process: 
25% of total no. of opt-in cases
57,314/100*25 = 14,329 Stage one 
and two ADR cases
Stage one ADR process: 71% of 
total no. of opt-in cases
57,314/100*71 = 40,692 Stage one 
ADR cases
No-ADR process: 3% of total no. of 
opt-in cases
57,314/100*3 = 1,719 No ADR 
process cases
Cost of different type of 
ADR opt-in and non-opt-
in cases
Stage one and two ADR 
process:14,329 cases, net unit 
cost of £185
Stage one and two ADR: 
14,329*£185 = £2,650,865
Stage one ADR process: 40,692 
cases, net unit cost of £231
Stage one ADR: 40,692*£231 = 
£9,399,852
No-ADR process: 1,719 cases, net 
unit cost of £202
No-ADR:1,719*£202 = £347,238
Non-opt-in: 16,166*£202 = 
£3,265,532
Non-opt-in cases: 16,166 net unit 
cost of £202
Total all case types = £15,663,487
Total costs - with and 
without the ADR process
If all cases dealt with using the 
‘normal’ process: 73,480 DLA 
cases, unit cost £202
Total cost assuming use of ADR 
process = £15,663,487
Total costs assuming all cases 
dealt with in ‘normal’ process = 
£14,842,960
Ministry of Justice Research Series 02/10
Evaluation of Early Neutral Evaluation Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Social Security and 
Child Support Tribunal
This study was commissioned to evaluate an Early Neutral Evaluation (ENE) pilot in the Social Security 
and Child Support Tribunal during September 2007 to January 2009. The evaluation sought to establish 
the cost effectiveness of ENE and whether it resulted in swifter, more proportionate resolution of cases, 
appellant satisfaction and the impact on and views of stakeholders. The pilot dealt with 2,081 cases to 
conclusion, of which 978 opted in. The other 1,103 cases involved cases where the claimant chose not 
to opt into ENE (non opt-in cases). For those who opted in there were two stages of the ENE process:
Stage one - where cases were read by a District Tribunal Judges (DTJ) who assessed the likely 
outcome of the appeal based on the paperwork (697 cases)
Stage two - where the DTJ then contacted the likely losing party to discuss the case, what 
decision they thought the tribunal was likely to make and why (249 cases). If there was no clear 
losing party the cases went forward for hearing in the normal way. 
The report presents the findings of analysis of administrative data, development of unit costs for different 
elements of the pilot, and interviews with the parties involved. The pilot found that opt-in cases overall 
had a lower rate of hearings and adjournments than non-opt-in cases. However, when comparing all opt-
in to non-opt-in cases the ENE process was not more cost effective and cases took longer to resolve. 
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